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CLAIM AND ISSUE PRECLUSION IN CIVIL
LITIGATION IN WASHINGTON
Philip A. Trautman*
The preclusive effect of a judgment is an age-old topic. Why then add
more to the existing commentary? Principally, it is because within recent
years there have been noteworthy cases and significant developments in the
governing principles. The purposes of this article are to recall the
orthodoxy of the subject, to note the changes that have been occurring, and
to suggest what may be forthcoming.
First, there is the problem of terminology. At times the term "res
judicata" is used in the cases and literature to refer to the entire subject of
the preclusive effect of judgments, including the relitigation of claims and
issues that were litigated, or might have been litigated, in a prior action. In
other instances, the term refers only to limitations on the relitigation of a
claim, or cause of action. When used in this sense, res judicata is usually
further subdivided into "merger" and "bar." The principles of merger
apply when the prior judgment was for the claimant; those of bar apply
when the judgment was for the party defending on the claim.
When res judicata refers only to preclusion of the same claim, the term
"collateral estoppel" denotes the preclusive principles that apply when the
subsequent suit involves a different claim but the same issue. In the rare
instance in which the same issue is raised in a later suit on the same claim,
and the principles of res judicata do not merge or bar the claim, the term
"direct estoppel" is used. '
Modernly, the principles of merger and bar have been encompassed
within the term "claim preclusion." The principles of collateral estoppel
have been encompassed within the term "issue preclusion." 2 In this article,
the terms claim preclusion and issue preclusion generally will be used to
refer to the preclusive effects ofjudgments. When the term "resjudicata" is
used, it will refer to merger and bar principles as distinguished from
"collateral estoppel" principles. 3
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., 1952, J.D., 1954, University of Washington.
13reparation of this article was supported in part by a research grant to the author from the University
of Washington School of Law.
1. See L. ORLAND, 2 WASHINGTON PRACTICE 399 (3d ed. 1972).
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1(1982).
3. A similar distinction is stated in Bodeneck v. Cater's Motor Freight Sys., 198 Wash. 21, 86 P.2d
766 (1939).
At times the terms are used interchangeably. See Wade v. Snohomish County Bonded Escrow, 13
Wn. App. 950, 538 P.2d 571 (1975). Any confusion or wrong usage should not, of course, affect the
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Two other prefatory points must be noted. This article concerns the
preclusive effects of a judgment within the jurisdiction in which it is
rendered, and particularly, within Washington. There will be only inciden-
tal reference to the subject of recognition and enforcement of ajudgment in
other jurisdictions. Further, the concern here is with the preclusive effects
of judgments in subsequent civil actions. The problems of "double
jeopardy" in criminal law will not be discussed.
The doctrines of claim and issue preclusion have similar purposes. Both
seek to put an end to litigation. This, in turn, limits the vexation and
harassment of other parties; lessens the overcrowding of court calendars,
thereby freeing the courts for use by others; and, by providing for finality in
adjudications, encourages respect for judicial decisions. 4
When the doctrines of preclusion are asserted, what is essentially in-
volved is a conflict between those principles favoring finality and those
favoring the allowance of relitigation to assure that a correct result is
reached. Within recent times, Washington courts have generally favored
finality.5 Even if the first court was in error, such as perhaps would have
justified a reversal on appeal, in a second independent proceeding the
predisposition will be in favor of preclusion. 6
This is not to say that mere similarity in the two proceedings will result in
preclusion. 7 While modern judicial development is in favor of finality, there
are certain requirements that must be met. And even if met, there will be
exceptions and instances in which relitigation will be allowed. The require-
ments for the preclusion doctrines, and the exceptions thereto, will be
developed herein.
Most of the discussion that follows will involve cases rather than statutes
or administrative regulations. This is because the law of preclusion is
almost entirely court-created. 8 The legislature has contributed very little to
the doctrines. 9 Moreover, the preclusion principles apply to judicial-type
result. Clippinger v. Birge, 14 Wn. App. 976, 983, 547 P.2d 871, 877 (1976).
4. Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn. 2d 392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967): Walsh v. Wolff. 32 Wn.
2d 285. 201 P.2d 215 (1949).
5. Bull v. Fenich, 34 Wn. App. 435,661 P.2d 1012 (1983); In re Marriage of Brown. 98 Wn. 2d 46.
653 P.2d 602 (1982).
6. Kinsey v. Duteau, 126 Wash. 330, 218 P.2d 230 (1923).
7. Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn. 2d 104, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977).
8. See J.M. Weatherwax Lumber Co. v. Ray, 38 Wash. 545, 548, 80 P. 775, 777 (1905), to the
effect that the question of former adjudication is one of law for the court.
9. An example of a legislative declaration is WASH. REV. CODE § 26.27.120, entitled, "'Binding
force and resjudicata effect of custody decree." This is part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, adopted in 1979.
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determinations rather than legislative or political decisions. 10 As a gener-
ality, once a judicial judgment is final, the preclusion doctrines apply, or at
least must be considered. 1'
I. RELATED DOCTRINES
Before developing claim and issue preclusion principles, it is useful to
distinguish other related doctrines.
A. Stare Decisis
The doctrine of stare decisis states that when a rule of law is laid down as
applicable to a certain set of facts, the court will apply that rule to other
cases involving identical or substantially similar facts. 12 It matters not that
the later cases involve completely different parties. Although the doctrine
has considerable strength to assure stability and certainty in court-made
law, it of course does not preclude change when reason and policy so
require. 13
B. Election of Remedies
At one time the doctrine of election of remedies was applied rather
strictly, and the mere commencement of an action might preclude subse-
quent proceedings. 14 While recent cases continue to state that Washington
recognizes the doctrine of election of remedies, the actual results reached
indicate that the doctrine, as such, will seldom have any real impact.
The modem rationale for the election doctrine is the prevention of double
recovery for the same wrong and the prevention of greater recovery than the
value of the harm suffered. 15 To implement this policy, there are three
requirements to bind a party by an election of remedies: 16 (1) there must be
10. State ex rel. Miller v. Thornton, 115 Wash. 190, 196 P. 585 (1921).
11. See Malo v. Anderson, 76 Wn. 2d 1, 5,454 P.2d 828, 830 (1969), wherein the court said, "A
supersedeas bond does not operate against a judgment but against its enforcement."
12. Floyd v. Department of Labor & Indus., 44 Wn. 2d 560, 269 P.2d 563 (1954).
13. Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 78 Wn. 2d 48,469 P.2d 902 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911
(1971); Hutton v. Martin, 41 Wn. 2d 780, 252 P.2d 581 (1953).
14. Eilers Music House v. Douglass, 90 Wash. 683, 156 P. 937 (1916); see also Behneman v.
Schoemer, 141 Wash. 560, 252 P. 133 (1927).
15. Bremerton Central Lions Club, Inc. v. Manke Lumber Co., 25 Wn. App. 1, 604 P.2d 1325
(1979).
16. Lange v. Woodway, 79 Wn. 2d 45, 483 P.2d 116 (1971). The court characterized the "concept
of election of remedies" as "a rule of narrow scope." Id. at 49, 483 P.2d at 119.
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two or more available remedies; (2) the remedies must be inconsistent with
one another; (3) the party to be bound must have chosen one of the
remedies. In almost every instance in which the doctrine has been raised in
recent decades, one or more of the elements has been found lacking.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the necessary multiple
remedies were not available when the first complaint was based on an
erroneous understanding of the facts, 17 when the first complaint sought a
remedy based on an unavailable theory of contract rather than tort, 18 and
when a second suit was against a different party. 19 To conclude that the
election doctrine does not apply when the first complaint is based on
erroneous facts, on an erroneous legal theory or on an erroneous choice of
parties is to severely limit its application. Another general limiting princi-
ple is that a remedy is not deemed available so as to invoke the doctrine
when there is a good defense to the first claimed remedy.20
Even if there are multiple remedies, a party is not bound to an election if
they are not repugnant and inconsistent with one another. The rule does not
apply where the remedies are cumulative and consistent. 21 Excellent mod-
ern examples are a holding that there is no inconsistency in seeking to
forfeit the interest of a contract purchaser of land and at the same time
seeking damages for conversion of timber from that purchaser, 22 and a
holding of no inherent inconsistency in a request for a variance to escape
the harm of a zoning ordinance and an attack on the validity of the
ordinance itself.23
Third, to constitute an election, the party to be bound must have chosen
one of the available inconsistent remedies. 24 With the modern liberality
17. Il re Wilson's Estate, 50 Wn. 2d 840, 315 P.2d 287 (1957).
18. Watkins v. Siler Logging Co., 9 Wn. 2d 703, 116 P.2d 315 (1941).
19. O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn. 2d 814, 816,440 P.2d 823,826 (1968), wherein the court said:
If a party believes he has a claim, but subsequent events prove the claim to be nonexistent, his
attempt to assert such claim in court does not constitute an election, barring pursuit of a
meritorious claim based on the same facts but against a different party. In such a case. it is
immaterial whether the remedy be nonexistent because it develops that the facts are different from
what the plaintiff supposed them to be, or whether the law applicable to the facts is found to be
other than the claimant supposed.
20. Willis T. Batcheller, Inc. v. Welden Constr. Co.. 9 Wn. 2d 392, 115 P.2d 696 (1941). See also
Babcock, Cornish & Co. v. Urquhart, 53 Wash. 168, 175, 101 P. 713, 716 (1909). wherein the court
stated: "It seems well settled that the doctrine of election of remedies has no application when the
remedy chosen is not available, and we think a remedy is not available when there is a good defense to
it.'"
21. Labor Hall Ass'n v. Danielsen. 24 Wn. 2d 75, 163 P.2d 167 (1945). Compare Bank of the West
v. Ves-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wn. App. 238. 548 P.2d 563 (1976).
22. Bremerton Central Lions Club v. Manke Lumber Co., 25 Wn. App. 1,604 P.2d 1325 (1979).
23. Lange v. Woodway, 79 Wn. 2d 45, 483 P.2d 116 (1971).
24. In McKown v. Driver, 54 Wn. 2d 46, 337 P.2d 1068 (1959), the court concluded that
prosecuting an action to final judgment constituted a choice of one remedy.
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allowed in pleading alternately and inconsistently and in amending the
original pleading, the mere commencement of an action should not or-
dinarily constitute a choice, nor should the pleader be put to a choice.25 If
the defendant were in some way to rely detrimentally on the plaintiff's
prayer for relief or to be otherwise prejudiced, the doctrine might be
invoked. 26 Such an invocation would be most unusual, however.27
With the severe limitations placed on the doctrine, the tendency to find
one or more of the requirements not to have been met, and the general
judicial displeasure with the doctrine, one may safely conclude that the
concept of election of remedies has little place in modem decisions.28
C. Preclusion of Inconsistent Positions
Another related doctrine is that a party may not assert a factual conten-
tion at variance with a contention made in previous litigation. This doctrine
is sometimes referred to as preclusion of inconsistent positions or estoppel
against taking inconsistent positions. The purposes of the doctrine are to
preserve respect for judicial proceedings without the necessity of resorting
to the perjury statutes and to avoid inconsistency, duplicity, and waste of
time.29 It has been said to be a rule of procedure based on manifest justice
and on considerations of orderliness, regularity, and expedition in litiga-
tion.30
For the doctrine to apply, there must be some act by the party to be bound
or precluded. A common example is pleading matters inconsistent with
pleadings in a former action between the same parties. 31 Doubt has been
expressed as to whether reliance and resultant damage must be found for the
25. See WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8, 15, & 18.
26. See Melby v. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., 13 Wn. App. 745, 537 P.2d 807 (1975).
27. It has been suggested that an element of ratification or estoppel is involved in most election of
remedies cases. See J. COUND, J. FRIEDENThAL & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES & MATERIALS
1044 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter J. COUND].
28. The court in Melbyv. Hawkins Pontiac, Inc., 13 Wn. App. 745,749,537 P.2d 807, 810 (1975),
stated: "More recent Washington decisions have looked askance at the sometimes harsh application of
the election of remedies doctrine." The court in Barber v. Rochester, 52 Wn. 2d 691, 695,328 P.2d 711,
713 (1958), characterized the doctrine as "at best. . . a harsh and obsolete rule"; see also Anderson
Feed & Produce Co. v. Moore, 66 Wn. 2d 237, 401 P.2d 964 (1965).
Subject matter jurisdiction considerations may at times require an election between two remedies.
See Hill v. Hill, 3 Wn. App. 783, 788, 477 P.2d 931, 935 (1970).
29. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Marshall, 31 Wn. App. 339, 641 P.2d 1194 (1982).
30. Mueller v. Garske, 1 Wn. App. 406, 461 P.2d 886 (1969).
31. Hedgecock v. Mendel, 146 Wash. 404,263 P. 593 (1928). The original pleading may have been
in proceedings in another state. Witzel v. Tena, 48 Wn. 2d 628, 295 P.2d 1115 (1956).
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rule to apply.32 Recently there has been some indication that reliance and
resultant damage are relevant factors, at least if the present adversary was
not a party to the prior proceeding. 33
For the doctrine to apply, the positions must be inconsistent in the sense
of being diametrically opposed to one another. As an example, a party was
not permitted to obtain a default judgment and then in a subsequent action
deny that the judgment was taken by default. 34 Further, the inconsistency
must be as to factual assertions. The doctrine does not require consistency
in points of law asserted or prevent a party from proceeding upon inconsis-
tent legal theories. 35
D. Law of the Case
Another doctrine should be distinguished, that of "law of the case."
While the term may encompass several concepts, 36 in the present context it
refers to the concept that once there is an appellate holding enunciating a
principle of law, that holding will be followed in subsequent stages of the
same litigation.
The foundation case for modern analysis is Greene v. Rothschild,37
decided in 1966. Prior to that case, the Washington court had rather rigidly
applied the principle that questions decided on the first appeal would not
again be reviewed. In Greene, the court stated that the doctrine of law of the
case is a discretionary rule that should not be applied where it would result
in manifest injustice. 38 Thus, just as the court is not obliged to perpetuate
its own errors under the doctrine of stare decisis when different cases are
involved, after Greene, the same is true when the error was made on a prior
appeal of the same case. As stated in Greene:
[A] holding should be overruled if it lays down or tacitly applies a rule of law
which is clearly erroneous, and if to apply the doctrine would work a manifest
32. See L. ORLAND, supra note 1, at 434. Compare Sagmeister v. Continental Casualty Co.. 141
Wash. 153, 155, 251 P. 124, 125 (1926) (suggesting the assumption of two inconsistent and irreconcila-
ble positions is enough) with Butler v. Supreme Court of The Indep. Order of Foresters, 53 Wash. 118.
125, 101 P. 481, 484 (1909) (indicating reliance and injury are necessary).
33. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Marshall, 31 Wn. App. 339, 641 P.2d 1194 (1982).
34. Mueller v. Garske, I Wn. App. 406, 461 P.2d 886 (1969). Compare Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v.
Marshall, 31 Wn. App. 339, 641 P.2d 1194 (1982) (divergent positions were not so diametrically
opposed as to require an application of an "equitable doctrine"); Rushlight v. McLain, 28 Wn. 2d 189.
182 P.2d 62 (1947).
35. King v. Clodfelter. 10 Wn. App. 514,518 P.2d 206 (1974). As a comparison, WASH. SUPER. CT.
CtV. R. 8(e)(2) allows any one pleading to contain alternate statements "regardless of consistency."
36. See Baumann, Appeal & Error-Law of the Case-Discretionary Rule, 2 GONZ. L. REv. 105
(1967).
37. 68 Wn. 2d 1, 414 P.2d 1013 (1966)
38. Id. at 8. 414 P.2d at 1015.
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injustice to one party, whereas no corresponding injustice would result to the
other party if the erroneous decision should be set aside.
39
Such circumstances were found in the particular case.
Since Greene, the approach stated therein has been followed. In some
instances, the doctrine has resulted in a refusal to reconsider a prior
holding;40 in others, a clearly erroneous holding has not had such pre-
clusive effect. 41 Even in its limited discretionary form, the doctrine applies
only to questions decided. Thus, matters not discussed or otherwise in-
volved in an appellate decision are not barred by the law of the case doctrine
from consideration in a subsequent appeal of the same litigation.42
Since July 1, 1976, there has been a relevant rule of court. 43 RAP 2.5(c)
sets forth two principles that apply if the same case is again before the
appellate court. First:
If a trial court decision is otherwise properly before the appellate court, the
appellate court may at the instance of a party review and determine the
propriety of a decision of the trial court even though a similar decision was not
disputed in an earlier review of the same case.
Second:
The appellate court may at the instance of a party review the propriety of an
earlier decision of the appellate court in the same case and, where justice
would best be served, decide the case on the basis of the appellate court's
opinion of the law at the time of the later review.
44
The principles discussed above relate to the effect of appellate holdings.
Apparently, the law of the case doctrine does not have general application
to trial court rulings.45 An exception is that jury instructions by the trial
court which are not challenged become the law of the case.46
39. Id. at 10, 414 P.2d at 1016.
40. Pierce County v. Desart, 9 Wn. App. 760,515 P.2d 550 (1973); Coy v. Raabe, 77 Wn. 2d 322,
462 P.2d 214 (1968).
41. Pier 67, Inc. v. King County, 78 Wn. 2d 48,469 P.2d 902 (1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 911
(1971).
42. Riley v. Sturdevant, 12 Wn. App. 808, 532 P.2d 640 (1975).
43. WASH. R. ApP. P. 2.5(c).
44. The law of the case doctrine may still be properly applied under RAP 2.5(c). See O'Brien v.
Franich, 19 Wn. App. 189, 575 P.2d 258 (1978).
45. MGIC Fin. Corp. v. H.A. Briggs Co., 24 Wn. App. 1, 600 P.2d 573 (1979).
46. Hojem v. Kelly, 93 Wn. 2d 143,606 P.2d 275 (1980); Peters v. Dulien Steel Prods., 39 Wn. 2d
889, 239 P.2d 1055 (1952).
Also, while the appellate court has discretion to overturn a prior holding in the same case,
presumably the trial court is bound by an appellate determination in the event of further proceedings
before the trial court on remand. See Bunn v. Bates, 36 Wn. 2d 100, 103, 216 P.2d 741, 743 (1950).
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E. Inconsistent Judgments
One other doctrine might be noted before turning to the principles
governing claim and issue preclusion. In the event preclusive principles are
not applied, as for example, if there is a failure to raise them and inconsis-
tent judgments result, it is the last judgment that controls. Thus, where a
claimant to logs, who had obtained a judgment adjudicating his ownership
thereof, elected to relitigate the issue and judgment was entered against




Claim preclusion, more traditionally called res judicata, is a doctrine
designed to curtail the relitigation of a claim or cause of action. For the
doctrine to apply, there must be substantial identity in the successive
proceedings. More particularly, the Washington Supreme Court has stated
for almost seven decades that ajudgment has claim preclusive effect only if
the successive proceedings are identical in four respects: (1) subject matter;
(2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the
persons for or against whom the claim is made.48
Whether the necessary elements are present, and thus whether a judg-
ment has preclusive effect, is to be determined at the time of the subsequent
litigation. 49 The second court must be advised of the prior proceeding and
the burden of pleading "res judicata" is listed among the affirmative
defenses. 50 The burden of proving that a claim is precluded is upon the
party opposing the claim. 5'
1. Subject Matter Identity
Of the four elements, the first, the same subject matter, has generated the
least discussion and the least guidance as to its meaning. The critical factors
seem to be the nature of the claim or cause of action and the nature of the
47. Watkins v. Sler Logging Co., 9 Wn. 2d 703, 116 P.2d 315 (1941).
48. Scores of cases have so stated, from Northern Pac. Ry. v. Snohomish County, 101 Wash. 686.
172 P. 878 (1918), to Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660, 674 P.2d 165 (1983).
49. Banchero v. City Council of Seattle, 2 Wn. App. 519, 468 P.2d 724 (1970).
50. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 8(c). Compare Marshall v. Chapman's Estate, 31 Wn. 2d 137, 195
P.2d 656 (1948).
51. See Meder v. CCME Corp., 7 Wn. App. 801, 502 P.2d 1252 (1972). Judicial notice will not be
taken of the record in another proceeding unless there is proper pleading and proof. See Large v.
Shively, 186 Wash. 490,498,58 P.2d 808,811 (1936): Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor Boom Co., 54 Wash.
542, 103 P. 833 (1909).
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parties. Seldom is a case decided on the basis of the subject matter element.
Rather, that element is found to be present, 52 or, if absent, the court will
find that one of the other elements is also missing, with some explanation as
to the latter, but not as to subject matter.
The court most often will simply state in a conclusory fashion that there
is or is not the same subject matter. This was true in the foundation case,
Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Snohomish County,53 which listed the four
elements, and has continued to the present. The most helpful approach to
understanding subject matter identity is to note a few of the more recent
conclusions.
The court has held that the subject matter in successive proceedings was
the same when both actions involved an alleged deprivation of constitu-
tional rights,54 rights in property allegedly governed by a community
property agreement, 55 and the cause of a nosebleed. 56 In contrast, the court
concluded that the same subject matter was not involved when the first
proceeding was a dissolution action and the second an action to partition
undisposed property,57 when successive actions involved different lots of
-land, 58 and when, although both lawsuits arose out of the same property
transaction, the first was an action for misrepresentation and the second an
action for breach of a covenant of title.59 In none of the cases was there any
discussion of the bases for determining the subject matter. In each there was
only a conclusion.
Another common feature in the cases is that, after listing the require-
ments of subject matter and cause of action separately, the court will often
unite the two in its discussion. 60 What usually receives specific treatment is
the nature of the cause of action or claim. That analysis is more helpful.
2. Claim or Cause of Action Identity
Claim preclusion, or res judicata, precludes the relitigation of the same
claim or cause of action. 61 Unlike issue preclusion, which applies only to
52. See Baxter v. Central W. Casualty Co., 186 Wash. 459, 58 P.2d 835 (1936).
53. 101 Wash. 686, 172 P. 878 (1918).
54. Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660, 674 P.2d 165 (1983).
55. Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn. 2d 124, 622 P.2d 816 (1980).
56. Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn. 2d 392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967).
57. Seals v. Seals, 22 Wn. App. 652, 590 P.2d 1301 (1979); see also de Carteret v. de Carteret, 26
Wn. App. 907, 615 P.2d 513 (1980).
58. St. Luke's Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Hales, 13 Wn. App. 483, 534 P.2d 1379 (1975).
59. Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wn. 2d 643, 673 P.2d 610 (1983).
60. A typical example is Burke Motor Co. v. Little, 39 Wn. 2d 918, 239 P.2d 854 (1952).
61. The court in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Kawachi, 19 Wn. App. 460, 462, 576 P.2d 68, 69
(1978), held, "The doctrine ofresjudicata applies only when the causes of action in the two suits are the
same." This holding was affirmed in 91 Wn. 2d 223, 588 P.2d 725 (1978).
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issues actually litigated, claim preclusion applies to what might, or should,
have been litigated as well as to what was actually litigated, if all part of the
same claim or cause of action. 62 This does not mean that a claimant must
join every claim which is joinable when an action is brought. 63 A judgment
upon one claim does not preclude suit upon another independent claim,
though both could have been joined originally. 64
Perhaps the simplest illustration of the doctrine is that in which a
claimant, after winning or losing the first action, sues a second time. If the
claimant prevailed in the first action and then sues again on the same claim,
the claim will be precluded under the theory that it is merged in the first
judgment, 65 or that the claimant may not split the cause of action. An
excellent illustration of the latter theory involved a party to a contract who,
after successfully suing for specific performance, was precluded from
bringing a subsequent action for damages for delays in performance occur-
ring prior to the institution of the first action. 66 If the claimant is unsuc-
cessful in the first proceeding, the claim will be precluded under the theory
that the subsequent action is barred. Thus, a judgment, denying injunctive
relief for an alleged contract violation on the ground that mutual mistake
62. A recent statement of the principle is found in Norris v. Norris, 95 Wn. 2d 124, 130, 622 P.2d
816, 820 (1980):
Res judicata acts to prevent relitigation of claims that were or should have been decided among the
parties in an earlier proceeding. In this case, because the applicability of the community property
agreement could and should have been determined in the probate of Irene's estate, res judicata
prevents the court from now reexamining the distribution in light of the community property
agreement ....
See also Marino Property Co. v. Port Comm'rs, 97 Wn. 2d 307, 644 P.2d 1181 (1982).
The general doctrine was first reported in Sayward v. Thayer, 9 Wash. 22, 24, 36 P. 966, 966, (1894)
as follows:
[T]he plea of resjudicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court
was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce judgment, but to every point
which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable
diligence, might have brought forward at the time.
63. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 18(a) permits joinder of all claims; it does not require joinder.
64. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Kawachi, 91 Wn. 2d 223, 588 P.2d 725 (1978).
65. Warren v. Rickles, 129 Wash. 443, 225 P. 422 (1924) (judgment on a contract against one
partner merged the claim and precluded an action against other partners).
66. Sanwick v. Puget Sound Title Ins. Co., 70 Wn. 2d 438, 423 P.2d 624 (1967).
Likewise, a judgment for the cancellation of stock fraudulently issued to the defendants and for its
issue to the plaintiffs precluded a subsequent damages action for depreciation in value of the stock while
wrongfully held by the defendants. Currier v. Perry, 181 Wash. 565, 569, 44 P.2d 184, 186 (1935).
Compare Kenworth Sales Co. v. Salantino, 154 Wash. 236, 239-41, 281 P. 996, 997-98 (1929), in
which there was no improper splitting in successive actions for installment payments on a conditional
contract where there was no exercise of the option to declare the whole debt due. But all installments
due at the time of bringing of the first action must be included. Hare v. Winfree, 131 Wash. 138,139,229
P. 16, 17 (1924).
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had not been established, barred a subsequent action to reform the contract
on the ground of mutual mistake. 67
Since the preclusive effect of the judgment turns upon the scope of the
claim or cause of action, a critical question is what test the court will apply
to determine the scope. Initially, two points may be made. In numerous
instances it has been held that a change in theories will not justify suc-
cessive actions. Thus, a second proceeding was not allowed when the first
contained a claim for rescission based on fraud, and the second contained a
claim for rescission based on inequitable conduct and mistake;68 when the
first sought an injunction against the removal of a child, and the second was
a habeas corpus proceeding to determine custody;69 when the first sought to
recover a half interest in land on the basis of certain wrongful acts by the
defendant, and the second asked for all the land because of fraudulent acts
by the defendant; 70 when the first was a tort claim based on seduction under
a promise of marriage, and the second was a contract claim based on breach
of promise of marriage;71 and when the first was an action by a vendor of
personal property to recover possession on a theory of conditional sale, and
the second was an action of replevin on a theory of rescission because of
fraudulent representations by the vendee.72 In each instance, whether
involving merger or bar, the court held that the change in theory in the
second proceeding did not represent a different claim or cause of action.
Likewise, it is clear that the availability of alternative remedies does not
create several separate claims. A judgment as to one remedy will have
claim preclusive effect in subsequent actions seeking other remedies. 73
If new theories and new remedies do not create different claims,
what, again, is the test? Occasionally, the court will simply state its
67. Tacoma Mill Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 120 Wash. 95, 172 P. 812 (1918); see also Large v.
Shively, 194 Wash. 608, 79 P.2d 317 (1938); Woodland v. Frst Nat'l Bank, 124 Wash. 360, 214 P. 630
(1923); Thompson v. Washington Nat'l Bank, 68 Wash. 42, 122 P. 606 (1912); Sayward v. Thayer, 9
Wash. 22, 36 P. 966 (1894).
68. Meder v. CCME Corp., 7 Wn. App. 801, 502 P.2d 1252 (1972).
69. State ex rel. Larish v. Superior Court, 134 Wash. 224, 235 P. 353 (1925).
70. Kinseyv. Duteau, 126 Wash. 330,218 P.2d 230(1923); see also Sweeney v. Waterhouse& Co.,
43 Wash. 613, 617, 86 P. 946, 946-47 (1906) (the addition of a theory based on factors existing at the
time of the first action did not constitute a new separate cause of action).
71. Rieger v. Abrams, 98 Wash. 72, 167 P. 76 (1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661(1918). But cf.
Spokane Sec. Fin. Co. v. Crowley Lumber Co., 150 Wash. 559,274 P. 102 (1929) (first action based on
contract and second on tort); White v. Miley, 138 Wash. 502, 244 P. 986 (1926) (first action based on
tort and second on contract).
72. Cuschner v. Longbehn, 44 Wash. 546, 87 P. 817 (1906).
73. Bill v. Gattavara, 34 Wn. 2d 645,209 P.2d 457 (1949) (recovery of treble damages in statutory
trespass action precluded an action for unjust enrichment. The court stated, "While several remedies
were available to Bill, he still had but one cause of action."). Id. at 651, 209 P.2d at 460. See also
Robinson v. Steele, 123 Wash. 282, 212 P. 167 (1923).
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conclusion. 74 However, much more often than with the element of subject
matter, the court will include an explanation with respect to the element of
cause of action.
A difficulty is that the explanation is not always consistent with previous
explanations because there has been no single all-inclusive test. Indeed, the
court, quoting from another source, has recently said that the identity of
causes of action cannot be determined precisely by mechanistic application
of a simple test. 75 The court listed, and applied, four criteria:
(1) [W]hether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be
destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether
substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether
the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two
suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.7 6
In another recent case, after noting the multiplicity of tests, the court
quoted another source to state that "the claim is the same if the same
primary right is violated by the same wrong in both actions, or if the
evidence needed to support the second action would have sustained the first
action. ',77
There are numerous cases, some very recent and some very old, ex-
plicitly relying upon an evidence analysis to determine whether the same
claim is involved in successive actions.78 Another large group of cases,
again some old and some new, is explained by an analysis of whether the
same rights are involved in both proceedings. 79 Occasionally, the court has
74. In re Welfare of Hansen, 24 Wn. App. 27, 599 P.2d 1304 (1979) (guardianship vs. depen-
dency); Roper v. Mabry, 15 Wn. App. 819, 551 P.2d 1381 (1976) (slander vs. breach of fiduciary duty
and civil fraud).
75. Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660,664,674 P.2d 165,168 (1983) (quoting Abramson v. University
of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202. 206 (9th Cir. 1979)).
76. Id. at 664,674 P.2d at 168 (quoting Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199.1201-02
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982) (quoting Harris v. Jacobs. 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th
Cir. 1980))).
77. Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wn. 2d 643, 646. 673 P.2d 610, 612 (1983) (quoting L. ORLAND,
supra note 1, at 400-01).
78. Marquardt v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co. (Mutual), 33 Wn. App. 865, 658 P.2d 20 (1983): Meder
v. CCME Corp., 7 Wn. App. 801, 502 P.2d 1252 (1972); Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co.. 71 Wn. 2d
392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967); Bodeneck v. Cater's Motor Freight Sys., 198 Wash. 21, 86 P.2d 766 (1939):
Curtiss v. Crooks, 190 Wash. 43, 66 P.2d 1140 (1937): Hart v. Bogle, 88 Wash. 125, 152 P. 1010 (1915):
Buddress v. Schafer, 12 Wash. 310. 41 P. 43 (1895).
79. King v. Department of Labor & Indus., 12 Wn. App. I. 528 P.2d 271 (1974) (aggravation
occurring subsequent to prior determination): Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 54 Wn. 2d 779, 345 P.2d 173
(1959) (successive actions for continuing nuisance) (compare Island Lime Co. v. Seattle, 122 Wash.
632, 211 P. 285 (1922); Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320. 154 P. 450 (1916)):
Marion Steam Shovel Co. v. Aukamp, 172 Wash. 455, 20 P.2d 851 (1933) (foreclosure of chattel
mortgage and later action on promissory notes); Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 247 P. 960 (1926)
(one cause of action for tort resulting in personal injury and property damage) (compare Fireman's Fund
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applied a test of whether a second proceeding would negate the first. 80
Also, occasionally the court has resolved the problem by inquiring whether
there were separate wrongs. 81
What conclusion is to be drawn from all this? When a court uses a variety
of tests, sometimes choosing one and sometimes another, how does it know
which to choose? How does counsel know which to rely upon to provide
advice? Might it be that over the years, in reality, the court has been
concerned with such considerations as whether the facts in the successive
actions are pragmatically related, whether the problems can best be re-
solved in a single proceeding, whether this would conform to the parties'
expectations or common understanding? Might it be that, without ex-
pressly saying so and perhaps intuitively, the court has been applying a
commonsense, functional approach? Might it be that the court's true
concern is whether it is confronted in the multiple suits with a single
transaction or series of related transactions? Would this not explain the felt
need for a multiplicity of tests to encompass the immense variety of factors
and problems?
If there is validity in these inquiries, a better approach would simply be
to state so. This would make clear to all what actually transpires. Perhaps
that is what the court had in mind in a recent case when it listed as a relevant
consideration, "whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts." 82 Regardless of the court's intent, this should be the
approach.
Where then is counsel to look to provide meaning to the words, "the
same transactional nucleus of facts"? In addition to the actual results in past
cases, sometimes disregarding the court's stated explanation, there is
available as of 1982 the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Of particular
relevance in determining the dimensions of a claim for purposes of merger
and bar is the following:
(1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the
. ..claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar . . . the claim ex-
tinguished includes all rights. . . to remedies. . . with respect to all or any
Ins. Co. v. Oregon R. &Nav. Co., 58 Wash. 332,108 P. 770 (1910));Helsley v. American Mineral Prod.
Co., 118 Wash. 571, 204 P. 190 (1922) (divisible contract) (compare Harstad v. Olson, 57 Wash. 264,
106 P. 741 (1910) (severable contract); Collins v. Gleason, 47 Wash. 62, 69, 91 P. 566, 568 (1907)
(indivisible contract)); Farnandis v. Seattle, 95 Wash. 587, 164 P. 225 (1917) (subsequent injury from
land slide); Parker v. Galbraith, 46 Wash. 280, 89 P. 712 (1907) (separate promissory notes).
80. Rader v. Sander, 100 Wash. 403, 171 P. 257 (1918).
81. See Marshall v. Champman's Estate, 31 Wn. 2d 137, 195 P.2d 656 (1948); Morgan v. Hart, 84
Wash. 496, 147 P. 26 (1915).
82. Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660, 674 P.2d 165 (1983).
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part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the
action arose.
(2) What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction," and what groupings
constitute a "series," are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to
such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business under-
standing or usage. 83
The discussion to this point might suggest that the principles presented
have application only to plaintiffs. Such is not the case, as is readily
apparent if one recalls that the policy is to preclude, under prescribed
circumstances, the litigation of that which has been litigated or should have
been litigated. This policy may properly apply to defendants.
Thus, the failure of the defendant to assert a defense that existed at the
time of the first proceeding may preclude later use of the defense.8 4 A
matter raised for defensive purposes may thereafter be precluded if asserted
as an affirmative claim. 85 Likewise, a failure to make an available defense
may preclude later presentation for recovery purposes.8 6
The content of the present court rule relating to counterclaims is consis-
tent with the cases supporting the prior principles. 87 From a pleading
perspective, any claim may be stated against an opposing party. With
certain qualifications not directly relevant to this discussion, a pleading
must state as a counterclaim any claim that the pleader has against any
opposing party if that claim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.88 Such a claim is
denominated a compulsory counterclaim.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982). The comments, illustrations and re-
porter's notes to this and succeeding sections are useful.
84. See Dunbabin v. Allen Realty Co., 26 Wn. App. 660, 666, 613 P.2d 570, 574 (1980) (matters
that "could have been asserted" or "urged" are "barred by collateral estoppel"); State ex rel. Crawford
v. Paul, 185 Wash. 306, 54 P.2d 411(1936): State ex rel. Paine v. Glover, 165 Wash. 567, 5 P.2d 1014
(1931).
85. See Angel v. Lados, 143 Wash. 622, 255 P. 945 (1927); Crabtree v. McDaniel, 143 Wash. 122.
254 P. 1092 (1927); Olson v. Title Trust Co., 58 Wash. 599, 109 P. 49 (1910); Spring Hill Irrigation Co.
v. Lake Irrigation Co., 42 Wash. 379, 85 P. 6 (1906).
86. See Cacek v. Boucher, I Wn. App. 905,466 P.2d 162 (1970); Symington v. Hudson. 40 Wn. 2d
331, 243 P.2d 484 (1952); Judish v. Rovig Lumber Co., 128 Wash, 287, 222 P. 898 (1924); Johnson v.
Spokane, 72 Wash. 298, 130 P. 341 (1913); Spokane Valley Land & Water Co. v. Jones & Co.. 53 Wash.
37, 101 P. 515 (1909); Compton v. Seattle, 38 Wash. 514, 80 P. 757 (1905).
87. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIv. R. 13.
88. Washington courts have not had occasion to define the terms "transaction" or "occurrence."
Presumably the test that will be applied is whether the pleader's claim is logically related to the
opposing party's claim. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 79, at 529 (4th ed. 1983).
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The failure to plead such a claim presumably will preclude the party
from bringing an independent action later. Any of several theories might be
relied upon to reach this result, including that of res judicata or claim
preclusion. 89 Perhaps the best explanation is simply reliance upon the
wording of the rule itself. Regardless of the theory, preclusion should
follow, as any other result would defeat the purpose of the compulsory
provision.
3. Identity of Persons and Parties
In addition to identity of subject matter and cause of action, for claim
preclusion to occur there must be identity of "persons and parties" and
identity "in the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is
made." 90 The first case to enunciate the four requirements for claim
preclusion established that in order to bind a person by a judgment, that
person must have been a party, or the person's interest must have been
represented by a party.91
A common way of stating the principle is that ajudgment is binding upon
all parties to the litigation as well as upon all persons in privity with such
parties. 92 That one is aware of certain proceedings is not enough.93
Whether one was a party to a prior proceeding and is thus bound is
ordinarily relatively easy to ascertain. 94 More difficult is whether one is "in
privity" with a party to a prior proceeding. The court has not attempted an
all-inclusive definition; that perhaps would not be possible or even desir-
able. Rather, the term is used in a conclusory sense. Consequently, the
most useful approach is to note categories in which privity has been found.
One category is successors in interest such as purchasers of land or other
property95 and assignees of contract rights.96 A more general category is
89. J. CouND, supra note 27, at 509-10.
90. Recent statements of the requirements are in Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660, 664, 674 P.2d
165, 168 (1983) and Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wn. 2d 643, 646, 673 P.2d 610, 612 (1983).
91. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Snohomish County, 101 Wash. 686, 688-89, 172 P. 878,879-80 (1918).
There, the court concluded that the party's interest was adverse to that of both parties in the prior action
and consequently res judicata did not apply.
92. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 92 Wn. 2d 939, 953, 603 P.2d 819, 826 (1979).
93. State ex rel. Lidral v. Superior Court, 198 Wash. 610, 618, 89 P.2d 501, 504 (1939).
94. More recent examples are Trust Fund Serv. v. Heyman, 88 Wn. 2d 698, 565 P.2d 805, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 987 (1977), ; State ex rel. Carroll v. Bastian, 66 Wn. 2d 546, 403 P.2d 896 (1965);
Sofie v. Kane, 32 Wn. App. 889,650 P.2d 1124 (1982); Davis v. Nielson, 9 Wn. App. 864, 515 P.2d 995
(1973); Kiecker v. Pacific Indem. Co., 5 Wn. App. 871, 491 P.2d 244 (1971).
95. McKown v. Driver, 54 Wn. 2d 46, 337 P.2d 1068 (1959); Watkins v. Siler Logging Co., 9 Wn.
2d 703, 116 P.2d 315 (1941); Ainslie v. Moss, 191 Wash. 625, 71 P.2d 679 (1937); Schaffer v. Stever, 153
Wash. 116, 279 P. 390 (1929).
96. Rodin v. O'Beirn, 3 Wn. App. 327, 474 P.2d 903 (1970); Anderson v. National Bank of
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persons whose interests are represented by a party.97 A third category is
those in actual control of the litigation. 98 In addition, there are cases that
extend privity to persons who participate in litigation though they are not in
actual control. 99 Perhaps most expansive are cases holding that testifying as
a witness is at times sufficient. 100
Only if there is identity of parties, including the privity concept, need
one consider the fourth element, identity in the quality of the persons for or
against whom the claim is made. In other words, "[tihere can be no identity
Tacoma, 146 Wash. 520, 264 P. 8 (1928).
97. These include such diverse examples as LaHue v. Keystone Inv. Co.. 6 Wn. App. 765. 496
P.2d 343 (1972) (corporation precluded by stockholder's derivative action): Fahrenwald v. Spokane
Say. Bank, 179 Wash. 61, 35 P.2d 1117 (1934) (action by one shareholder in society bound other
shareholders); Symons v. Hutchinson. 119 Wash. 430, 205 P. 1057 (1922) (proceeding by judgment
creditor in aid of execution barred later suit by judgment debtor to enjoin sheriff); DeMuth v. Kleeb. 114
Wash. 607, 195 P. 996 (1921) (action by trustee in bankruptcy to recover unpaid stock subscriptions due
insolvent corporation precluded later action by creditors); State ex rel. Forgues v. Superior Court for
Lewis County, 70 Wash. 670, 127 P. 313 (1912) (action by taxpayer to enjoin holding of local option
election precluded later similar action by another taxpayer). Compare Kincaid v. Hensel. 185 Wash.
503, 55 P.2d 1050 (1936).
98. Woodruffv. Coate, 195 Wash. 201,80 P.2d 555(1938): Ramsey v. Wilson, 52 Wash. II1. 100 P.
177 (1909). Compare Pasco v. Pacific Coast Casualty Co., 101 Wash. 496. 172 P. 566 (1918).
A recent case, Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 37 Wn. App. 690.
682 P.2d 317 (1984), quoted favorably from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 39, as
follows: "A person who is not a party to an action but who controls or substantially participates in the
control of the presentation on behalfofa party is bound by the determination of issues decided as though
he were a party." Id. at 693, 682 P.2d at 319. This principle was applied in Mutual ofEnunclaw Ins. Co.
to an insurer who took over the defense of its insured. See also State ex rel. Partlow v. Law, 39 Wn. App.
173, 692 P.2d 863 (1984).
99. See, e.g., Youngquist v. Thomas, 196 Wash. 444, 83 P.2d 337, amended, 196 Wash. 456. 87
P.2d 1120 (1938); Edmiston v. Empire Ice & Shingle Co., 147 Wash. 490,266 P.2d 703 (1928): Douthitt
v. MacCulsky, II Wash. 601,40 P. 186 (1895). To the extent there was absence of control of the litigation
in such cases, their soundness is questioned in L. ORLAND, supra note 1, at 415.
100. Though it is not clear whether witnesses were actually deemed to be "in privity." they were
held bound in Bacon v. Gardner, 38 Wn. 2d 299, 229 P.2d 523 (1951): Briggs v. Madison, 195 Wash.
612. 82 P.2d 113 (1938): American Bonding Co. v. Loeb, 47 Wash. 447. 92 P. 282 (1907): and
Shoemake v. Finlayson, 22 Wash. 12, 60 P. 50 (1900). See also Desimone v. Spence, 51 Wn. 2d 412.415
n.3. 318 P.2d 959. 961 n.3 (1957) ("The witness is bound by the judgment to the same extent as a
party."): Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn. 2d 105, 112, 221 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1950) ("It is true, as argued by
appellant, that a judgment rendered may be res judicata against a witness who testified in the action.
Appellant cites authorities to this effect, but, in these authorities, the subject matter of the actions was
identical and was the only matter contested in the proceedings. "). Again. L. ORLAND, supra note 1. at
416, is critical, absent control.
Compare Dunlap v. Wild, 22 Wn. App. 583, 591 P.2d 834 (1979), which involved the question of
whether a witness might benefit by a judgment rather than the question of whether the witness was
bound. The court stated:
In order for res judicata to apply there must be identity of the parties to the current adjudication
with those in the prior adjudication .... Wild was a key witness in the arbitration proceeding.
but he was never made a party to it nor is he in privity with a prior party. Therefore, he cannot claim
that the arbitration proceeding is res judicata to the present suit.
Dunlap, 22 Wn. App. at 588,591 P.2d at 837. Because of the rejection of the mutuality requirement. the
witness did benefit by the application of collateral estoppel.
820
Claim and Issue Preclusion
of quality if there is no identity of parties." 101 Few cases seem to have
turned upon the absence of the fourth element alone, and, consequently,
there is little guidance as to the exact meaning of the "quality" factor. 102
Presumably, it would come into play in situations where the named parties
are the same, but one or the other acts in a different capacity in the two
proceedings. 103
It was earlier suggested that a pragmatic, functional approach should be
invoked to determine whether separate claims or causes of action are
involved. A similar analysis should be applied to determine whether there
is an identity of parties and their "quality." There is recent supportive
authority.
In Rains v. State, 104 an action was first brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against named members of the state public disclosure commission. Plain-
tiff claimed a deprivation of constitutional rights. Following ajudgment for
the defendants, plaintiff filed a second complaint for violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, with the state and the commission named as defendants. The court
held the doctrine of resjudicata applied. Though the parties were somewhat
differently named in the two suits, the court concluded that they were
"qualitatively" the same. The suit against the commission members was in
reality a suit against the state. Quoting from another source, the court said,
"Identity of parties is not a mere matter of form, but of substance ....
[P]arties nominally different may be, in legal effect, the same."10 5 Though
the case involved the particular question of whether there was the necessary
identity between state officials and the state, the approach potentially has a
broader application. 106
101. Burke Motor Co. v. Lillie, 39 Wn. 2d 918, 922, 239 P.2d 854, 856 (1952).
102. In Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn. 2d 392,429 P.2d 207 (1967), the court concluded
there was a lack of identity of quality between the persons and parties to the two proceedings, as
prescribed by the fourth concurrence of identity, since the first proceeding was "nonadversary"
involving a "protector," whereas the second involved an "avowed adversary." Id. at 397-98, 429 P.2d
at 210. But the court had already determined there was lack of identity of persons or parties (the third
necessary concurrence), thereby negating a need to fully consider the fourth.
103. An example might be a case such as Flessher v. Carstens Packing Co., 96 Wash. 505, 165 P.
397 (1917), in which an individual first sued as guardian ad litem for his daughter for personal injuries to
her and then sued to recover expenses incurred for medical and nursing care of the child. The court held
there was no preclusion as there were two different causes of action.
104. 100 Wn. 2d 660, 674 P.2d 165 (1983).
105. Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660, 664, 674 P.2d 165, 169 (1983) (quoting Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,402 (1940), in turn quoting Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Schendel,
270 U.S. 611, 620 (1926)).
106. In another recent case, Mellor v. Chamberlin, 100 Wn. 2d 643, 646,673 P.2d 610,612 (1983),
the court concluded that while the identity of the parties was the same, their "quality" differed as the
causes of action changed in the two suits from misrepresentation to breach of covenant of title.
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B. Final Judgment on the Merits
Assuming the necessary identity in the two proceedings, there is the
question of what determinations have claim preclusive effects. For res
judicata principles to apply, there must be a final judgment on the merits. 107
Whether such a judgment exists poses no problem in the great majority of
cases. 108 Occasionally, however, there is an issue of whether a determina-
tion is final or on the merits.
An excellent recent example is Leija v. Materne Brothers, Inc. 109 Plain-
tiff instituted a wrongful death action alleging breach of contract or
negligence. She moved for a partial summary judgment on the contract
claim. The motion was denied and the first suit was then voluntarily
dismissed. Plaintiff brought a second action for wrongful death, again
alleging breach of contract and negligence. Defendant raised the defense of
res judicata, which the trial court sustained. This was held to be error since
the denial of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment was not a
dismissal of plaintiff's claim. The denial meant only that plaintiff was not
entitled to a summary judgment. Since there was not a final judgment on
the merits in the first action as to the contract, there was no claim preclu-
sion.
When an order is clearly intended to be interlocutory in nature, res
judicata does not apply. 1 0 Thus, finality was lacking for claim preclusion
purposes when there was only an oral announcement of a decision in the
first action, 1 1I when findings were still being prepared in the first proceed-
ing, 112 when findings of fact and conclusions of law had been made but no
judgment had been entered, 1 3 and when the order in question was one
denying a motion for a preliminary injunction. 114
Even though a determination is final on a particular point, the decision
may not reach the merits of the controversy. As an example, the dismissal of
an action on the ground that it was prematurely brought, the claim not yet
having accrued, was not a judgment on the merits nor a bar to another
107. Leija v. Materne Bros., 34 Wn. App. 825, 827, 664 P.2d 527, 528 (1983).
108. Thus, an unappealed determination of the extent of a worker's disability was final and binding
as to his condition at that time. Quine v. Department of Labor & Indus., 14 Wn. App. 340. 342-43. 540
P.2d 927, 929 (1975).
109. 34 Wn. App. 825, 664 P.2d 527 (1983).
110. See Pinkney v. Ayers, 77 Wn. 2d 795, 796, 466 P.2d 853, 854 (1970).
11I. Magee v. Risley, 82 Wash. 178, 143 P. 1088 (1914).
112. Westmoreland Co. v. Howell, 62 Wash. 146, 113 P. 281 (1911).
113. Wilson v. Hubbard, 39 Wash. 671, 82 P. 154 (1905).
114. McLean v. Smith, 4Wn. App. 394,482 P.2d 798(197 ); see also State v. Drake, 16 Wn. App.
559, 558 P.2d 828 (1976) (in criminal context, order deferring sentence and granting probation lacked
requisite finality for res judicata purposes).
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action after the necessary time had elapsed. 115 Although it is for the court in
the second proceeding to decide whether a claim is precluded, 116 this
decision is aided if the first court clearly states whether it intends its
determination to have preclusive effect. Thus, a judgment expressly
providing that it is without prejudice should not have preclusive effect. 117
Conversely, a judgment stated to be "with prejudice" indicates that it is
intended to be on the merits. 118
If such clarification as to intent is lacking, it is important to recall that res
judicata is an affirmative defense with the burden of proof resting upon the
party pleading the defense. 119 Consistent with this, the court has stated that
if there were two questions in the original proceeding, upon either of which
the judgment could have rested, with one going to the merits and the other
not, the disposition of the case will generally be considered to have rested
upon the issues which did not go to the merits, in the absence of any finding
as to the ground for the decision. 120 There is other authority, however, to the
effect that if a former judgement is pleaded as a bar, and there is nothing in
the judgment pleaded which indicates that the case was not tried and
decided upon the merits, the burden is upon the party asserting that the
decision was not on the merits to so establish. 121 To avoid such difficulties,
the intended effect should be stated in the judgment.
A somewhat different problem is illustrated by Gable v. Allen.122 An
action for breach of promise of marriage was decided against the plaintiff
on the alternate grounds that she did not attach any credit to the defendant's
promise, and hence could not predicate any action upon it, and that, if she
did attach credit to it, the time for performance had not arrived and her
action was premature. In short, the decision was based upon two alternative
grounds, one on the merits and the other not. The court held that in such a
situation there is a decision on both grounds, although either alone would
115. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Cohn, I Wn. 2d 54, 62-63, 95 P.2d 38, 42 (1939). The particular
issue of prematurity would, of course, presumably be precluded.
116. Banchero v. City Council of Seattle, 2 Wn. App. 519, 468 P.2d 724, 729 (1970).
117. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Port of Seattle, 106 F.2d 777, 781(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S.
661 (1939); Russell v. Leslie, 142 Wash. 60, 252 P. 151 (1927); Case v. Knight, 129 Wash. 570, 225 P.
645 (1924); A.H. Averill Mach. Co. v. Allbritton, 51 Wash. 30, 97 P. 1082 (1908) (former judgment
dismissed for want of sufficient evidence); Bates v. Drake, 28 Wash. 447, 68 P. 961 (1902) (even if first
court erred in refusing to give judgment on merits).
118. Banchero v. City Council of Seattle, 2 Wn. App. 519,525,468 P.2d 724,729 (1970); Seattle
Nat'l Co. v. Gilmore, 167 Wash. 102, 9 P.2d 95 (1932); Morgan v. Hart, 84 Wash. 496,147 P. 26 (1915);
see also McGuire v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 53 Wash. 425, 102 P. 237 (1909).
119. See Meder v. CCME Corp., 7 Wn. App. 801, 807, 502 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1972).
120. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Cohn, 1 Wn. 2d 54, 63, 95 P.2d 38, 43 (1939).
121. Sweeney v. Waterhouse & Co., 43 Wash. 613, 616, 86 P. 946 (1906).
122. 25 Wn. 2d 186, 169 P.2d 699 (1946).
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have been sufficient to support judgment, and a subsequent action based
upon the same cause of action was precluded.1 23
If a final judgment on the merits is entered by the trial court, a question
may arise as to its effect during the pendency of an appeal. While there is
some difference of opinion across the country, in Washington the rule is
that an appeal does not suspend or negate the preclusive aspects of the trial
court judgment. 124
The preceding general principles will be applied to resolve questions of
the existence of a final judgment on the merits. To note a few of the more
common areas posing the problem will be useful. Judgments entered on the
basis of the consent of the parties, 125 or as a result of compromise or
settlement, 126 have been given res judicata effect. Similarly, a default
judgment has claim preclusive effect as to issues that were or might have
been raised. 127
Voluntary dismissals are governed principally by a court rule. 128 There-
under, it is directed that the court shall dismiss an action when all parties so
stipulate in writing or upon motion of the plaintiff at any time before the
plaintiff rests at the conclusion of his opening case. Ordinarily, such a
dismissal is without prejudice and thus does not bar a subsequent proceed-
ing on the same claim. 129 After the plaintiff rests his opening case, the
plaintiff may move for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice upon good
cause shown and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper. 130 At this point in the proceedings, the trial court may in its
discretion direct that the dismissal be without prejudice, except that an
order of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when
obtained by a plaintiff who has once dismissed an action based on or
including the same claim in any court of the United States or of any state.
The effect of involuntary dismissals also requires initial reference to a
court rule. 131 The relevant rule provides that a civil action shall be dis-
missed, without prejudice, for want of prosecution if the claimant neglects
to note the action for hearing within one year after any issue of law or fact
has been joined. This is initiated by motion of the adversary. The same rule
123. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 20 comment (e) (1982).
124. Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co.. 57 Wn. 2d 619.621,358 P.2d 975,977 (1961): Seattle Nat'l Co. v.
Gilmore, 167 Wash. 102, 9 P.2d 95 (1932).
125. LaBire v. Department of Labor & Indus., 14 Wn. 2d 407, 128 P.2d 308 (1942): Winton Motor
Carriage Co. v. Blomberg. 84 Wash. 451, 147 P. 21 (1915).
126. In re Phillips' Estate, 46 Wn. 2d 1, 278 P.2d 627 (1955).
127. Baskin v. Livers. 181 Wash. 370, 374, 43 P.2d 42, 43 (1935).
128. WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 41(a).
129. Keron v. Namer Inv. Corp., 4 Wn. App. 809, 810, 484 P.2d 1152, 1153 (1971).
130. Jackson v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Wn. App. 83. 102, 505 P.2d 139,150 (1972).
131. WASH. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 41(b).
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provides for dismissal for want of prosecution, again without prejudice, in
all civil cases wherein there has been no action of record during the twelve
months just past. This is implemented by notice from the clerk of the
superior court.
The pertinent subsection of the rule concludes, "[u]nless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies,. any dismissal not provided for
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper
venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudica-
tion upon the merits."1 32
Older authority concluded that a judgment was on the merits if entered
following the granting of a demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. 133 On the basis of the provision quoted above,
presumably the same result will now be reached in the event of a dismissal
for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 134 In view of
the liberal provisions for amending a complaint, such a result is appropri-
ate. 135
C. Character of the Tribunal
The discussion to this point might suggest that it is only a determination
by a court which will have preclusive effect. It is true that if the necessary
prerequisites are met, the decision of any court at any level may preclude
further litigation. Thus, when a plaintiff successfully sued in ajustice court
for damages to her automobile resulting from a traffic accident, she was
thereafter precluded from suing in a superior court for her personal injuries
in the same accident. 136
Assuming that the necessary conditions are met, however, the decisions
of tribunals other than courts may have preclusive effect. A decision by an
administrative agency may be binding if that was the intention of the
legislature in creating the agency. 137 A common example has been deter-
minations by the Department of Labor and Industries of individual
132. With respect to dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, see Peacock v. Piper, 81 Wn. 2d 731,504
P.2d 1124 (1973), and In re Cogswell's Estate, 189 Wash. 433, 65 P.2d 1082 (1937).
133. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Davies, 2 Wn. 2d 155, 159-60, 97 P.2d 686, 688 (1940);
Comyns v. Painter, 172 Wash. 285, 19 P.2d 1104 (1933); Kinsey v. Duteau, 126 Wash. 330, 218 P. 230
(1923) (even if ruling on the demurrer was error which would have resulted in reversal had there been an
appeal); State ex rel. Schmidt v. Superior Court, 62 Wash. 556, 114 P. 427 (1911).
134. WASH. SUPER. Cr. CIv. R. 12(b)(6).
135. Id. R. 15.
136. Sprague v. Adams, 139 Wash. 510, 520, 247 P. 960, 963 (1926).
137. Spokane & Inland Empire R.R. v. Spokane County, 75 Wash. 72,81, 134 P. 688,692 (1913).
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controversies arising under the Worker's Compensation Act. 138 In addition,
the court has held that the award of an arbitrator may preclude further
litigation. 139 The major concern is whether the particular body acted in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity.
Also of consequence is the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal.
Even a superior court judgment may have less preclusive effect if the court
is acting in a situation in which its jurisdiction is limited. Perhaps the best
known instance is that of an unlawful detainer action wherein the superior
court's jurisdiction is limited to issues incident to the right of possession.
Issues not so related are not precluded from being asserted in a later
ordinary civil action. 140 Another example is a potential counterclaim that is
beyond the monetary jurisdiction of a justice court. The failure to assert the
counterclaim does not preclude a separate action later. 141
In short, one may not conclude that the preclusion doctrines apply only
to decisions by courts nor, on the other hand, that those doctrines apply in
the same fashion to all decisions of all courts. The character of the tribunal
is a relevant, but not necessarily controlling, factor.
D. Qualifications to Claim Preclusion
As noted earlier, within recent times there has been strong sentiment in
favor of finality. This is viewed as serving the interests of society and the
parties in bringing an end to litigation. Thus, a subsequent change in a
judicial interpretation of applicable law does not affect the res judicata
effect of judgments entered under the prior law. This is so even though other
persons similarly situated who did not pursue court actions benefit fully
from the new judicial interpretation. If prior judgments could be modified
to conform with subsequent changes in judicial interpretations, there might
never be an end of litigation. 142
Nevertheless, even if there is identity in the successive actions, a final
judgment on the merits, and a proper tribunal, claim preclusion does not
automatically follow. While there are strong policies arguing for finality,
there are other, equally strong and possibly countervailing, policies in the
138. LeBire v. Department of Labor& Indus., 14 Wn. 2d 407, 128 P.2d 308 (1942) (decision by
department that arthritic condition was not due to injury precluded further litigation upon the question
of the cause of the condition).
139. Dunlap v. Wild, 22 Wn. App. 583, 591 P.2d 834 (1979).
140. Mead v. Park Place Properties, 37 Wn. App. 403, 681 P.2d 256(1984); Phillips v. Hardwick.
29 Wn. App. 382, 628 P.2d 506 (1981); Pine Corp. v. Richardson, 12 Wn. App. 459, 530 P.2d 696
(1975); Miller v. Smith, 119 Wash. 163, 205 P. 386 (1922).
141. Centennial Flouring Mills Co. v. Schneider, 16 Wn. 2d 159,167, 132 P.2d 995, 997 (1943):
see also State ex rel. Alaska Pac. Navigation Co. v. Superior Court, 113 Wash. 439, 194 P. 412 (1920).
142. Columbia Rentals, Inc. v. State, 89 Wn. 2d 819, 823, 576 P.2d 62, 65 (1978).
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law. Res judicata is a court-created concept and is subject to flexible,
pragmatic application.
The fact that the party to be bound could not have appealed the prior
judgment, or that the earlier decision was by another court on a question
concerning a problem that is peculiarly within the province of the second
court, may result in no preclusive effect.143 If the claim had not fully
ripened so that complete recovery was not possible in the first action, a
second proceeding may be permitted. 144 Another limitation is that where
the parties have been induced by fraud not to bring into the original action
all the matters that might have been therein litigated, they are not then
precluded from introducing those matters in a subsequent lawsuit. 145 Mis-
take induced by the other party is similarly treated. 146
In each of the above instances, an independent factor, such as the nature
of the proceedings, of the claim, or of the actions of the other party, resulted
in a qualification or amelioration of the usual preclusion principles. The
court's concern with reaching a just result in a particular instance prevailed
over the desire for finality. Other notable examples exist.
Howell v. Hunters Exchange State Bank 47 involved the foreclosure of a
chattel mortgage upon property in one county. In a later action, foreclosure
was sought upon property in another county. The plaintiff could have
proceeded against all the property in one action, and the court stated that
there had been a splitting of the cause of action. The court further noted,
however, that it might enforce or refuse to enforce the rule against splitting
of causes of action as the justice of the particular case required. 148 It
appeared that the two proceedings had actually resulted in less expense than
would have been true had one been instituted, and that such expense was
one that would have been borne by the objecting party, the mortgagor.
Consequently, the objecting party had not been harmed, and the rule
against splitting was not invoked.
143. As to the inability to appeal, see United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp. 1042 (E.D.
Wash. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970). As to the local problem, see Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
Tacoma, 49 Wn. 2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957), rev'd, 355 U.S. 888 (1957). Both cases involved issue
preclusion, but similar policies might apply to claim preclusion problems.
144. Two cases involving breach of covenants of title illustrate the point. Mellor v. Chamberlin,
100 Wn. 2d 643, 673 P.2d 610 (1983); Harsin v. Oman, 68 Wash. 281, 123 P. 1 (1912).
145. Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 141 Wash. 86, 91-92, 250 P. 947, 949 (1926).
146. White v. Miley, 137 Wash. 80, 83, 241 P. 670, 671-72 (1925).
147. 149 Wash. 249, 270 P. 831 (1928).
148. The court also stated that the action was one in equity. Plaintiff was the mortgagor who
brought the action to restrain the mortgagee bank from proceeding with the second foreclosure. The
bank in its answer sought foreclosure. The trial court sustained the right to foreclose and was affirmed
on appeal. Surely, it would have made no difference if the second proceeding had simply been by the
bank, as plaintiff, to foreclose. Further, surely it ought make no difference whether the action is
characterized as one in equity or law. In either instance, the preclusion principles should be applied to
accomplish justice. See L. ORLAN, supra note 1, at 422.
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Another example involved two successive condemnation actions for a
private way of necessity against the same owner. 149 The court stated that the
rule against splitting was primarily for the benefit and protection of the
defendant. The court further stated that instances arise where its non-
enforcement will work no particular injury to the defendant and where its
enforcement may cause serious loss and damage to the plaintiff. Such an
instance was found here. While the owner would be inconvenienced by
having to appear twice, the expenses would be borne by the condemnor,
there were justifiable reasons for two general condemnation proceedings,
and the claimant might suffer serious loss if it could not condemn. Again,
justice prevailed over strict rules of res judicata.
A final illustration involved defendants who obtained a deed to certain
land from the plaintiff, immediately mortgaged it to a third person, and
then, instead of giving the plaintiff any security for the unpaid balance, left
the state with the borrowed money. The plaintiff instituted two actions, the
first to recover damages in the amount of the mortgage and the second to
cancel the deed. The deed cancellation action was completed first with
judgment for the plaintiff. The trial court also found for the plaintiff in the
damages action, but on appeal this was reversed. The court held that the
plaintiff had divided a single cause of action, and that this was not
permissible. Despite an acknowledgment that this was "a provoking case,"
and a seeming reference to the defendant as a "rascal" and one of the
"meanest," res judicata principles precluded the damages recovery. 150
Upon rehearing, the court reversed its position. ' 5' The court stated that
the defendant should have interposed in the second action the pendency of
the first action or moved for consolidation of the two. Not having done so,
the defendant had waived its objection. Further, and particularly relevant
here, the court stated that the first judgment was res judicata only as to
matters actually tried and decided, and that the only harm to defendant was
being vexed by two actions. But, of course, res judicata encompasses not
only what was litigated but what might have been litigated as part of the
original cause of action. Also, a principal objective of the doctrine is to
prevent double vexation.
The true explanation for the result was that it was unjust to apply the
usual preclusion concepts in the particular case. As the dissent had said in
the first hearing, to find for the defendants was to send them forth "free with
$1,400 of ill-gotten gains" with the court assisting the defendants to
149. State ex rel. White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court, 145 Wash. 576, 261 P. 110 (1927).
150. Brice v. Starr, 90 Wash. 369, 372, 156 P. 12, 14 (1916).
151. Brice v. Starr, 93 Wash. 501, 161 P. 347 (1916).
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effectuate "a palpable though round-about grand larceny." 152 Upon reflec-
tion, the court was not prepared to do this, and consequently it granted a
rehearing and reversed its position.
This is as it should be. Even at the expense of some predictability, there
will be instances when more important policies should prevail than those
supporting the claim preclusion doctrine. 153
III. ISSUE PRECLUSION
The orthodox statement is that the doctrine of collateral estoppel differs
from res judicata in that, instead of preventing a second assertion of the
same claim or cause of action, collateral estoppel prevents a second
litigation of issues even though a different claim or cause of action is
asserted. 154 More modernly, then, just as res judicata has come to be called
claim preclusion, collateral estoppel has come to be called issue preclu-
sion.
In one sense res judicata is the more comprehensive doctrine since it bars
an entire claim and not just a particular issue. 155 In another sense, collateral
estoppel is the broader as it applies to subsequent actions involving dif-
ferent claims. 156 The two doctrines are alike in that both are intended to
prevent relitigation.157
Both are also alike in that they may apply to decisions by entities other
than courts. Like res judicata, in appropriate circumstances collateral
estoppel can prevent relitigation of issues determined by an administrative
agency acting in a judicial capacity. 158 The applicability of collateral
estoppel depends upon a number of factors, including "(1) whether the
agency acting within its competence made a factual decision; (2) agency
152. Brice v. Starr, 90 Wash. 369, 372, 156 P. 12, 14 (1916).
153. See also United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (E.D. Wash. 1968),
aff'd, 435 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1970) (no preclusion when "injustice would result"); Weidlich v.
Independent Asphalt Paving Co., 94 Wash. 395, 406, 162 P. 541, 545 (1917) (no preclusion "in the
interests of justice and certainty").
154. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Kawachi, 91 Wn. 2d 223, 225-26,588 P.2d 725,727 (1978). See
Coughlin v. Christofferson, 72Wn. 2d 1039,431 P.2d 997 (1967);Pekolav. Strand, 25Wn. 2d98,168
P.2d 407 (1946).
155. Bordeaux v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn. 2d 392, 429 P.2d 207 (1967).
156. In the unusual instance in which the same issue is raised in a later suit on the same claim and
the principles of res judicata do not merge or bar the claim, the term "direct estoppel" is applied with
respect to the issue. See L. ORLAND, supra note 1, at 399.
157. Luisi Truck Lines v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wn. 2d 887, 435 P.2d 654
(1967).
158. Malland v. Department of Retirement Sys., 103 Wn. 2d 484, 694 P.2d 16 (1985).
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and court procedural differences; and (3) policy considerations." 159 Like-
wise, an arbitrator's award can have collateral estoppel effect if the neces-
sary requirements are met. 160
As previously noted, this article is concerned with preclusion problems
in civil litigation. Preclusion problems that arise in a criminal context are
beyond its scope, except as they may bear upon the outcome in a civil
proceeding. Such may be the case in the event of a criminal prosecution
followed by a civil suit.
In Seattle-First National Bank v. Cannon161 the defendants were con-
victed in federal court of conspiracy and of aiding and abetting embezzle-
ment of funds from a bank. The bank then brought a civil action to recover
the money. The trial court granted a summary judgment against the
defendants based upon their criminal conviction. The court held that they
were collaterally estopped from denying that they wrongfully took funds
from the bank. On appeal the findings of conspiracy and of aiding and
abetting in embezzlement were affirmed. The doctrine of collateral estop-
pel was applicable since the defendants had been accorded all the pro-
cedural protections of a criminal trial, including a higher burden of proof
than that in the later civil action. 162
Compare Beckett v. Department of Social and Health Services. 163 The
defendant was acquitted of grand larceny in a proceeding in which she was
charged with the fraudulent receipt of public assistance monies. Subse-
quently a civil fraud proceeding was instituted. The court held that collat-
eral estoppel did not apply since the failure to meet the "beyond a reason-
able doubt" standard in the criminal action did not mean that the "clear,
cogent, and convincing" standard could not be met in the later civil
action. 164
159. See State v. Dupard, 93 Wn. 2d 268, 275, 609 P.2d 961, 964 (1980) (public policy dictated
that parole board revocation hearing decision not have collateral estoppel effect in criminal prosecution
proceeding).
160. Dunlap v. Wild, 22 Wn. App. 583, 590, 591 P.2d 834, 838 (1979).
161. 26 Wn. App. 922, 615 P.2d 1316 (1980).
162. Compare the older case of Priest v. American Smelting & Ref. Co.. 409 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir
1969).
163. 87 Wn. 2d 184, 550 P.2d 529 (1976). Accord Young v. City of Seattle, 25 Wn. 2d 888. 172
P.2d 222 (1946).
164. Similarly, because of the different burdens of proof, collateral estoppel did not apply in a
parole revocation proceeding based on the same factual circumstances that had resulted in an acquittal
in a prior criminal prosecution. Standlee v. Smith, 83 Wn. 2d 405, 518 P.2d 721 (1974): see also
Standlee v. Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf. State v. Dupard, 93 Wn. 2d 268, 609 P.2d 961
(1980) (state not collaterally estopped in criminal case from relitigating issue previously decided in
favor of defendant at parole revocation hearing).
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When issue preclusion is asserted, the Washington court will usually
open its discussion with the statement that affirmative answers must be
given to four questions before collateral estoppel is applicable:
(1) Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? (2) Was there a final judgment on the
merits? (3) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication? (4) Will the application of the
doctrine not work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is to be
applied? 165
If the other questions are answered in the affirmative, the requirement of
a final judgment on the merits should be applied in a pragmatic, flexible
fashion. One must keep in mind that the problem here is one of issue
preclusion, not claim preclusion. If a particular issue has been decided in a
proceeding in which the person to be bound was a party, or in privity, and if
injustice will not be done by invoking preclusion, the lack of a technically
final judgment should not control. A recent case supports this approach:
after reciting the four questions, the court concluded that a final adjudica-
tion of rights is more important than a final decree. 166
The other three questions require more extended treatment. One addi-
tional introductory inquiry must be noted, however. Does the doctrine of
collateral estoppel preclude an issue in a conclusive or a prima facie sense?
While there is of necessity built-in flexibility in the application of the
relevant considerations for determining whether an issue is precluded, the
preclusion must be conclusive. The first determination either establishes a
conclusion or it does-not; it does not simply tend to support a conclusion.
Again, a recent case is in accord with this position. 167
A. Same Issue
As indicated previously, for collateral estoppel to apply, the issue de-
cided in the prior adjudication must be identical with the one presented in
165. A recent statement and application of the questions is in Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660, 665,
674 P.2d 165, 168 (1983). The original listing of the questions was in Lucas v. Velikanje, 2 Wn. App.
888, 894,471 P.2d 103, 107 (1970), which relied upon the landmark case of Bernhard v. Bank of Am.
Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,122 P.2d 892 (1942) and Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72
Wn. 2d 109, 431 P.2d 961 (1967).
Occasionally, the requirements for collateral estoppel and res judicata will be confused. See In re
Estate of Rynning, I Wn. App. 565,569, 462 P.2d 952,954-55 (1969), wherein the court stated that for
either doctrine to be applicable, there must be a concurrence of identity of subject matter, cause of
action, persons and parties, and the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.
166. Bull v. Fenich, 34 Wn. App. 435,439, 661 P.2d 1012, 1014 (1983).
167. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Cannon, 26 Wn. App. 922, 615 P.2d 1316 (1980).
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the immediate action. 168 The party asserting collateral estoppel has the
burden of showing such identity. 169 The burden was found to have been met
when in two successive actions an issue was whether certain land was in a
natural water drainage course, 170 whether a doorway was negligently
maintained, 17 1 and whether a lease was valid.172
In comparison, the burden was not met when in the two actions the
meaning of a term arose in different contexts; 173 when the first action
involved a city's alleged duty to issue a permit and the second the city's
alleged liability for negligence in issuing an invalid permit; 174 when the
first action included a finding of "fraud" and "wrongful" conduct in a civil
sense, but the second involved a question as to the truth of incriminating
slanderous statements of theft and embezzlement; 175 and when the first
action concerned whether the driver of a vehicle was acting within the
scope of his employment, whereas the second involved the question
whether the use of the car was with permission of the owner within the
meaning of an insurance policy.176 Although not a common occurrence,
Washington courts have held that collateral estoppel should not apply when
the first court clearly indicates that it does not intend to foreclose a
particular issue. 177
Recall that the doctrine of res judicata precludes not only what was
litigated, but what might have been litigated, if the latter is part of the same
claim or cause of action. Collateral estoppel applies to other claims, but
168. A recent case discussing the principle is Malland v. Department of Retirement Sys., 103 Wn.
2d 484, 694 P.2d 16 (1985).
169. Luisi Truck Lines v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wn. 2d 887, 894. 435 P.2d
654, 659 (1967).
170. Island County v. Mackie, 36 Wn. App. 385, 675 P.2d 607 (1984) (in first action party as
plaintiff was unsuccessful in seeking injunction to prevent flow of water over his land; in second suit as
defendant he was required to pay damages when he used self-help to block flow).
171. Sample v. Chapman, 7 Wn. App. 129,497 P.2d 1334 (1972) (plaintiff, unsuccessful in a suit
against tenant, precluded on issue in subsequent action against landlord).
172. Dolan v. Smith, 25 Wash. 214, 65 P. 190 (1910) (under a one-year lease, landlord who lost in
action for second month's rent was precluded in second action at end of year).
173. Luisi Truck Lines v. Washington Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 72 Wn. 2d 887, 895, 435 P.2d
654, 659-60 (1967) (first action involved meaning of term "fruit and vegetables" as applied to right to
haul canned goods, whereas second related to fruit and vegetables immersed in brine, refrigerated, or in
other semi-processed condition).
174. Haslund v. City of Seattle, 86 Wn. 2d 607, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976).
175. Roper v. Mabry, 15 Wn. App. 819,551 P.2d 1381 (1976) (court stated that the elements, proof,
and nature of civil fraud for breach of a fiduciary duty are not identical to those of larceny, theft, or
embezzlement; thus issues not identical for collateral estoppel purposes).
176. Greene v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 51 Wn. 2d 569, 320 P.2d 311 (1958).
177. In re Richland Hyatt House, Inc., 18 Wn. App. 426, 430, 568 P.2d 825, 827 (1977); see also
Wilber v. Western Properties, 22 Wn. App. 458,589 P.2d 1273 (1979); Curtis v. Crooks, 190 Wash. 43,
66 P.2d 1140 (1937).
832
Vol. 60:805, 1985
Claim and Issue Preclusion
precludes only those issues that have actually been litigated and deter-
mined. 178 At times, it will be clear that an issue was not litigated. An
excellent illustration is a judgment entered upon stipulated findings of fact
and embodying a settlement of the parties. 179 At other times, it is not clear
whether an issue was actually litigated. If a verdict or judgment is ambigu-
ous or indefinite, or if there is uncertainty as to whether an issue was
previously litigated, collateral estoppel will not be applied to that issue. 180
Further, actual litigation and determination of an issue is not enough.
The issue must have been material and essential to the first controversy. 181
The requirement of actual litigation of an essential issue provides some
assurance that the issue received the attention of the parties and the judge in
the first proceeding, thereby justifying its conclusive effect in the sec-
ond. 182
In some recent cases the analysis has been in terms of ultimate versus
evidentiary facts. Relying upon the original Restatement of Judgments, the
court has stated that the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies to determina-
tions of ultimate facts but does not extend to evidentiary facts. 183 Ultimate
178. The court in Davis v. Nielson, 9 Wn. App. 864, 874, 515 P.2d 995, 1002 (1973), held:
"Collateral estoppel applies only to issues which were actually decided in prior litigation and does not
operate as a bar to matters which could have then been raised but were not."
179. Yakima Cement Prods. Co. v. GreatAm. Ins. Co., 14Wn. App. 557, 544P.2d 763 (1975);see
also Marquardt v. Federal Old Line Ins. Co. (Mutual), 33 Wn. App. 685, 658 P.2d 20 (1983) (denying
collateral estoppel to a judgment of dismissal based on a settlement agreement). Compare In re
Jaussaud's Estate, 71 Wn. 2d 87, 426 P.2d 602 (1967).
180. Mead v. Park Place Properties, 37 Wn. App. 403, 407, 681 P.2d 256, 259 (1984); Lake v.
Butcher, 37 Wn. App. 228, 679 P.2d 409 (1984); Gibson v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n Hosps., 3
Wn. App. 214, 473 P.2d 440 (1970). For language to the effect that an ambiguous and inconsistent
judgment should not be the basis for collateral estoppel, see Peterson v. Department of Ecology, 92 Wn.
2d 306, 313, 596 P.2d 285, 289 (1979).
Older useful foundation cases are Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn. 2d 109, 431 P.2d 961
(1967); Hamm v. Camerota, 48 Wn. 2d 34,290 P.2d 713 (1955); and Rufener v. Scott, 46 Wn. 2d 240,
280 P.2d 253 (1955).
181. East v. Fields, 42 Wn. 2d 924,259 P.2d 639 (1953); Fies v. Storey, 37 Wn. 2d 105,221 P.2d
1031 (1950).
The principle is excellently stated in McGee v. Wineholt, 23 Wash. 748,751, 63 P. 571,571 (1901):
As was said by the court of appeals of New York in People v. Johnson, 38 N.Y. 63 [97 Am. Dec.
770], "And, although a decree in express terms professes to affirm a particular fact, yet, if such fact
was immaterial, and the controversy did not turn upon it, the decree will not conclude the parties in
reference to that fact." It is clear that the issue tendered was not material in the action to foreclose
the mortgage, as its maintenance was not an essential to the right of appellant to foreclose.
182. See Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, 8 Wn. App. 689, 509 P.2d 86 (1973).
183. The foundation case is Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Kawachi, 91 Wn. 2d 223, 588 P.2d 725
(1978). The court quoted from the RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENrs § 68 (1942), as follows:
(1) Where a question of fact essential to the judgment is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, the determination is conclusive between the parties in a subsequent action on a
different cause of action . ...
(2) A judgment on one cause of action is not conclusive in a subsequent action on a different cause
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facts are said to be facts directly at issue in the first controversy upon which
the claim rests; evidentiary facts are facts that may be in controversy in the
first action and are proven but that are merely collateral to the claim
asserted. 184
An obvious difficulty is what does all of this mean. One approach is to
note the results in three cases using the terminology. In the first case, the
original action involved a 1967 transaction. For the purpose of showing the
relations between the parties, evidence was introduced relating to some
transactions in 1961 and 1962. Following a judgment for the defendant,
suit was brought on the 1961 and 1962 transactions. Several reasons were
stated for the conclusion that the first judgment had no preclusive effect.
One was that any finding upon the 1961 and 1962 matters was upon a
question that was evidentiary rather than ultimate. 185
In the second case, an issue as to the propriety of a method of accounting
was decided in a federal securities action. Subsequently, there was a
shareholder's action to enforce an arbitration clause to settle a dispute as to
the method of accounting. Collateral estoppel was denied because it was
said to be unclear that the first determination involved an ultimate fact. 186
The third case involved a criminal conviction in federal court of conspir-
acy and of aiding and abetting embezzlement of funds from a bank.
Subsequently, the bank sued the defendants to recover $43,000, the amount
allegedly embezzled. The determination that the defendants were guilty of
conspiracy and of aiding and abetting in embezzlement was said to involve
ultimate facts. However, though the federal district court had required
restitution of a specific sum, and the federal court of appeals had recited a
figure of $43,000 in its opinion, the amount of damages was held to be
evidentiary and not within the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 187
In each of the three cases, the rationale is stated largely in conclusory
terms with little additional explanation. As mentioned, this approach was
based on the original Restatement of Judgments. As of 1982, there is now a
Restatement (Second) of Judgments. Its approach is different. 188
of action as to questions of fact not actually litigated and determined in the first action.
The court further quoted from § 68 comment p (1948 Supp.):
Evidentiary facts. The rules stated in this Section are applicable to the determination of facts in
issue, i.e., those facts upon whose combined occurrence the law raises the duty or the right in
question, but not to the determination of merely evidentiary or mediate facts, even though the
determination of the facts in issue is dependent upon the determination of the evidentiary or
mediate facts.
91 Wn. 2d at 228, 588 P.2d at 729.
184. Beagles v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 25 Wn. App. 925, 931, 610 P.2d 962, 966 (1980).
185. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Kawachi, 91 Wn. 2d 223, 229, 588 P.2d 725, 729 (1978).
186. Beagles v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 25 Wn. App. 925, 931. 610 P.2d 962, 966 (1980).
187. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Cannon, 26 Wn. App. 922, 928, 615 P.2d 1316, 1321 (1980).
188. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment j (1982).
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One reason for rejecting the original Restatement's approach is the
difficulty in distinguishing ultimate facts from evidentiary facts. Further,
even if a fact is categorized as evidentiary, great effort may have been
expended by the parties in seeking to persuade the judge of its truth or
falsity, and it may have been regarded as akey issue in the dispute. Based on
such considerations, the appropriate question, as stated in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, is not whether ultimate or evidentiary facts are
involved, but whether the issue was actually recognized by the parties as
important and by the judge as necessary to the first judgment. If so, the
determination should be conclusive, with an important qualification being
whether the significance of the issue for purposes of the subsequent action
was sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the first action. 189
In reality, the Washington cases are perhaps implicitly based on such an
analysis. If not, they should be. When the opportunity presents itself, the
approach of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, or something com-
parable, should be adopted. 190 This approach is clearer and more mean-
ingful than the "ultimate fact" versus "evidentiary fact" approach. Con-
sequently, it is much more useful for counsel in predicting results and in
providing sound advice.
One remaining question is how to determine whether there has been
actual litigation and decision of an essential issue. The burden of establish-
ing that such occurred rests with the party asserting collateral estoppel. 191
Ordinarily, reference to the record of the prior litigation will-provide the
answer. 192 For example, the pleadings may aid in ascertaining what issues
were involved, though other parts of the record may establish that a
particular issue raised in the pleadings was not actually litigated. 193 In
addition to the pleadings, the court has looked to rulings on the ad-
missibility of certain evidence, 194 the contents of jury instructions, 195 the
prior judgment itself,196 and appellate opinions in the prior litigation. 197
189. Other potential qualifications and exceptions are stated in id. § 28.
190. Id. § 27 comment j (1982) has a useful citation of relevant cases, texts, and articles.
191. See Bradley v. State, 73 Wn. 2d 914,917,442 P.2d 1009, 1011(1968); State v. Barton, 5 Wn.
2d 234, 105 P.2d 63 (1940).
192. The court in Beagles v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 25 Wn. App. 925, 932, 610 P.2d 962, 966
(1980), stated: "When collateral estoppel is asserted as a bar, the record of the prior action must be
before the trial court so that it may determine if the doctrine precludes relitigation of the issue in
question."
193. SeeDolbyv. Fisher, I Wn. 2d 181, 95 P.2d 369 (1939) (no evidence introduced on issue raised
in the pleadings).
194. State v. Harris, 78 Wn. 2d 894, 901,480 P.2d 484, 487-88 (1971), rev'd on other grounds,
404 U.S. 55 (1971).
195. State v. Harris, 2 Wn. App. 272, 469 P.2d 937 (1970). For subsequent opinions in the same
case, see supra note 194.
196. Long v. Eisenbeis, 21 Wash. 23, 56 P. 933 (1899).
197. Island County v. Mackie, 36 Wn. App. 385, 675 P.2d 607 (1984).
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In a case tried to the judge without a jury, the court's findings may be
very useful. The same is true in a jury-tried case if there is a special verdict
or a general verdict accompanied by answers to special interrogatories. 198
On the other hand, a general verdict alone will often leave unanswered the
question of which issues were decided by the jury. 199 Lastly, there is
authority that extrinsic evidence may be considered to establish the issues
litigated and determined in the prior proceeding.200
B. Persons Bound
Assuming a final judgment on the merits in the first action and an identity
of issue in the two proceedings, the third question is whether the party
against whom preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to
the prior adjudication. A negative answer will generally result in no
collateral estoppel. 201
One who was a party to the prior proceeding, whether as a claimant or as
a defending party, will usually be bound, assuming the other requirements
are met.20 2 Similarly, one will be bound if in privity with a party. 20 3 For
collateral estoppel purposes, privity has been found between a vendor and a
purchaser of real property,204 between the original owner of property and
some other successor in interest, 205 between a guardian and her ward,206
and between the named party and another who actually conducted or
controlled the litigation. 207
198. Nickert v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 335 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Wash. 1971): Simpson
Timber Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 19 Wn. App. 535, 576 P.2d 437 (1978).
199. Excellent examples are Mead v. Park Place Properties, 37 Wn. App. 403, 681 P.2d 256
(1984): State v. Peele, 75 Wn. 2d 28, 448 P.2d 923 (1968); Rufener v. Scott, 46 Wn. 2d 240. 280 P.2d
253 (1955): Braley Motor Co. v. Northwest Casualty Co., 184 Wash. 47,49 P.2d 911(1935): and Brehm
Lumber Co. v. Niblock, 46 Wash. 180, 89 P. 1134 (1907).
State v. Funkhouser. 30 Wn. App. 617,627,637 P.2d 974,979 (1981), suggests that other parts of the
record, such as the pleadings, evidence, and instructions, may at times aid in deciding what issues were
determined by a general verdict.
200. See Nunn v. Mather, 60 Wash. 484, 487, 111 P. 566, 567 (1910); Marble Sav. Bank v.
Williams, 23 Wash. 766, 63 P. 511 (1901).
201. Erickson v. Fargo Van & Storage, 25 Wn. App. 502, 507, 607 P.2d 894,898 (1980): Disch v.
Raven Transfer & Storage Co., 17 Wn. App. 73, 561 P.2d 1097 (1977); International Brotherhood of
Pulp, Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, AFL-CIO v. Delaney, 73 Wn. 2d 956, 442 P.2d 250 (1968).
202. American Linen Supply Co. v. Nursing Home Bldg. Corp., 15 Wn. App. 757, 766-67. 551
P.2d 1038, 1045 (1976).
203. Bergh v. State, 21 Wn. App. 393,404,585 P.2d 805,812(1978). Cf. Owens v. Kuro. 56 Wn.
2d 564, 354 P.2d 696 (1960) (no privity between passengers in a vehicle and the driver of the vehicle).
204. Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 54 Wn. 2d 779, 345 P.2d 173 (1959).
205. Bull v. Fenich, 34 Wn. App. 435, 661 P.2d 1012 (1983).
206. In re Estate of Rynning, I Wn. App. 565, 462 P.2d 952 (1969).
207. Kilber v. Maryland Casualty Co., 74 Wash. 159, 132 P. 878 (1913); see also Johnson v.
McGilchrist, 174 Wash. 178, 24 P.2d 607 (1933).
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In a few instances issue preclusion has been applied to bind one who was
not a party nor in privity with a party. A recent case so concluded in holding
that in some circumstances a witness in an action may be bound by the
judgment. 20 8 Another instance is that in which the so-called "vouching in"
doctrine applies.
In some situations a third person may be liable to reimburse or indemnify
a defendant for its liability to a claimant. At times it will be possible to join
the third person as a party to the original action. 20 9 In other instances such
joinder will not be feasible, as for example, if the third person is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the court.
A possible alternative may be the "vouching in" of the third person. If
the defendant gives proper and timely notice of the proceedings and tenders
the opportunity to defend, the third person will be bound by any judgment
upon the question of the defendant's liability to the original plaintiff.210 The
question of the third person's liability to indemnify the defendant will
require subsequent determination. 211 However, in a later action against the
third person (the vouchee), collateral estoppel will apply to issues deter-
mined in the first proceeding, assuming that the usual requirements are
met. 212 The end result will be issue preclusion as to a person not a party nor
meeting the usual concepts of privity.
Circumstances justifying application of the "vouching in" doctrine are,
of course, somewhat out of the ordinary. Even more unusual is Kyreacos v.
Smith.213 A Seattle police detective was convicted of first degree premedi-
tated murder. Thereafter, the widow of the victim, individually and as
executrix of her husband's estate, brought a wrongful death action against
the detective and the City of Seattle. On her claim that the city was liable
208. In Hackler v. Hackler, 37 Wn. App. 791, 795, 683 P.2d 241, 243 (1984), the court stated as
follows:
Thus the Hacklers are correct in their assertion that collateral estoppel does not apply to them by
reason of privity, as that concept is usually understood. This, however, is not the end of the matter,
because there is an exception to the requirement that one be a party or in privity with a party to the
prior litigation.
One who was a witness in an action, fully acquainted with its character and object and interested
in its results, is estopped by the judgment as fully as if he had been a party.
209. This might be done by joining the third person as a third-party defendant under WASH. SUPER.
Or. Civ. R. 14.
210. See Dixon v. Fiat-Roosevelt Motors, Inc., 8 Wn. App. 689, 693,509 P.2d 86,90 (1973). The
opportunity to defend must be tendered for the principle to apply. Farmers' Warehouse Co. v. Fry, 181
Wash. 365, 43 P.2d 23 (1935).
211. See Yakima Cement Products Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 14 Wn. App. 557,563, 544 P.2d
763, 767 (1975); Inashima v. Wardall, 128 Wash. 617, 224 P. 379 (1924).
212. See Yakima Cement Products Co. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 14 Wn. App. 557, 561, 544 P.2d
763,766 (1975); Greene v. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 51Wn. 2d 569, 320 P.2d 311 (1958); East v.
Fields, 42 Wn. 2d 924, 259 P.2d 639 (1953).
213. 89 Wn. 2d 425, 572 P.2d 723 (1977).
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under the doctrine of respondeat superior, summary judgment was entered
for the city. The trial court held that the criminal conviction was conclusive
in the civil case on the issue of whether the detective was acting within the
scope and course of his employment by the city in killing the plaintiff's
husband.
The supreme court affirmed and held that the commission of premedi-
tated murder by the detective precluded any possibility that he was acting
within the scope and course of his employment.2 14 The court acknowledged
that the plaintiff was not a party nor in privity with a party in the criminal
case, but concluded that there was no injustice or prejudice to the plaintiff
despite a "lack of identity, mutuality, in the criminal case." 2 15 The court
noted that there has been an erosion in the doctrine of mutuality.2 16 This is
true, as will be developed in detail in the succeeding section.
The relevance of such erosion is not clear, however. The mutuality
doctrine or its rejection is of consequence in determining who may benefit
from a judgment. The problem in Kyreacos, however, was one of who was
bound by a judgment. The result of holding that the widow was bound
cannot be explained by the ordinary principles of collateral estoppel, nor by
recognized exceptions. That Kyreacos will have any broad impact is
doubtful, and it is best to regard it, as did the court, as "a most unique case
which must be confined to its peculiar facts and to its procedural pos-
ture. "217
On occasion, collateral estoppel has been denied between persons who
were parties to both proceedings. If the parties were not adversaries in the
first proceeding, there was no preclusion. 218 Some older cases looked to the
pleadings to determine if such adverseness was present. 2 19 Others seemed
more concerned with the realities of the litigative process than with the
technicalities of pleading.220 And most recently the presence or absence of
adverseness, in and of itself, has seemed to be of little consequence.
Rather, the question has been whether the party to be bound had the
motivation and the opportunity to fully and fairly present its position in the
first proceeding.22 ' If the answer is yes, collateral estoppel may apply
214. Id. at 427, 572 P.2d at 724.
215. Id. at 428, 572 P.2d at 724.
216. Id., 572 P.2d at 724.
217. Kyreacos v. Smith, 89 Wn. 2d 425, 428, 572 P.2d 723, 724 (1977).
218. Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Bremerton Bridge Co., 2 Wn. 2d 52, 59, 97 P.2d 162, 164 (1939);
Snyder v. Marken, 116 Wash. 270, 199 P. 302, 22 A.L.R. 1272 (1921); Alaska Pac. S.S. Co. v. Sperry
Flour Co., 107 Wash. 545. 182 P. 634, 185 P. 583 (1919).
219. Sanders v. Sheets, 142 Wash. 155, 159,252 P. 531,533(1927); Bollong v. Corman, 117 Wash.
336, 201 P. 297 (1921).
220. See Nickert v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co., 335 F. Supp. 1162 (W.D. Wash. 1971); Morgan
v. Hart, 84 Wash. 496, 147 P. 26 (1915).
221. Simpson Timber Co. v. Aetna Casualty& Sur. Co., 19 Wn. App. 535, 576 P.2d 437 (1978).
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despite the lack of adverseness. This seems correct. With the relaxation of
the mutuality doctrine, it is now possible for a stranger to benefit by a
judgment. It is certainly proper, then, under appropriate circumstances, for
one party to benefit against another, even though they were not adversaries
in the first action.
C. Doing Justice
In determining the propriety of invoking issue preclusion, the last
question the court will ask is whether application of collateral estoppel will
work an injustice on the party against whom the doctrine is invoked. The
question raises numerous considerations, one of which is what persons
should be allowed to benefit by ajudgment. More particularly, should one
who was not a party, or in privity thereto, benefit?
Until the last two decades, the general answer was in the negative. This
was because of the requirement of mutuality. It was said that just as a
stranger was not bound by a judgment, likewise the stranger should not be
permitted to benefit. The estoppel had to be mutual. 222
There were exceptions. These principally centered around the situation
in which a claimant unsuccessfully sought recovery from one allegedly
primarily liable and then brought another action against one derivatively
liable. Though, because of lack of privity, the latter would not have been
bound had the first judgment been for the claimant, courts held that such a
party could benefit from the judgment. The doctrine of mutuality did not
apply.223 Otherwise, the person derivatively liable would be denied the
possibility of indemnity, or the one primarily liable would be required to
reimburse the one derivatively liable, even though the one primarily liable
had already been exonerated. Either alternative was deemed unacceptable.
Situations in which the mutuality doctrine was deemed inappropriate
included those of principal-agent, 224 employer-employee, 225 and master-
servant.226
222. Leading Washington cases generally supporting the requirement of mutuality were Bordeaux
v. Ingersoll Rand Co., 71 Wn. 2d 392,429 P.2d 207 (1967); Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn. 2d 564,354 P.2d
696 (1960); State ex rel. Fust Nat'l Bank v. Hastings, 120 Wash. 283, 207 P. 23 (1922).
223. See Gerritsen v. City of Seattle, 164 Wash. 459,465-66,2 P.2d 1092, 1094 (1931). Likewise,
the person derivatively liable might rely upon ajudgment against the primary party as being the limit of
liability. Marshall v. Chapman's Estate, 31 Wn. 2d 137, 146, 195 P.2d 656, 661 (1948) (dicta).
224. Greene v. Rothschild, 68 Wn. 2d 1,402 P.2d 356,414 P.2d 1013 (1965, 1966); see also W.G.
Platts, Inc. v. Wendt, 70 Wn. 2d 561, 424 P.2d 629 (1967).
Judgment for the agent based on a personal defense does not preclude a second suit against the
principal. See Vern J. Oja & Assocs. v. Washington Park Towers, Inc., 15 Wn. App. 356, 360-61,549
P.2d 63, 67 (1976), aff'd, 89 Wn. 2d 72, 569 P.2d 1141 (1977).
225. Ogilvie v. Hong, 175 Wash. 209, 27 P.2d 141 (1933).
226. Doremus v. Root, 23 Wash. 710, 63 P. 572 (1901).
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The first major break in the orthodoxy of mutuality was suggested in
Henderson v. Bardahl International Corp.227 The court stated, "We recog-
nize that there are many cases where the issues of mutuality, privity, and
the offensive-defensive distinction should not be permitted to obstruct the
application of collateral estoppel by judgment. ,228 The clear intent was that
collateral estoppel might apply despite the fact that the person relying on
the doctrine was a non-party, not in privity with a party, and regardless of
whether the non-party was relying upon the prior judgment for defensive or
recovery (offensive) purposes. 229
The court actually resolved the problem before it on other grounds. 230
Nevertheless, the language in Henderson served as the base upon which
subsequent cases rejected application of the mutuality doctrine.
What was dictum in Henderson became holding in Lucas v. Velikanje.23 1
The plaintiff first instituted an action to set aside a trust. She was unsuc-
cessful because a jury determined that there had been no fraud in the
execution of the trust. Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted a second action
against a different defendant, an attorney, claiming malpractice for failure
to discover fraud. The court held that the issue of fraud was precluded in the
second proceeding. Since there was no fraud, there could be no malpractice
in failing to discover it. In effect, one who would not have been bound by
the first judgment had it been adverse was allowed to benefit when it was
favorable. Mutuality was not required.
In that particular case collateral estoppel was successfully invoked by a
stranger for defensive purposes. Other, more recent, cases have reached a
similar result. 232
227. 72 Wn. 2d 109, 431 P.2d 961 (1967). The case is noted in Collateral Esloppel-Denise of
Mutuality in Washington?, 44 WASH. L. REV. 449 (1969).
228. Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn. 2d 109, 116, 431 P.2d 961, 966 (1967).
229. The court in Henderson preceded the quoted textual language with the observation that there
were earlier cases in which Department of Labor & Industries determinations were used offensively and
defensively in actions by employees and employers. Offensive examples cited were Miller v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 60 Wn. 2d 484, 374 P.2d 675 (1962), and Prince v. Saginaw Logging Co., 197 Wash. 4. 84
P.2d 397 (1938). Henderson, 72 Wn. 2d at 116 n.12, 431 P.2d at 966 n.12. A defensive example was
Shoopman v. Calvo. 63 Wn. 2d 627,388 P.2d 559 (1964). Henderson, 72 Wn. 2d at 116 n.12. 431 P.2d at
966 n.12.
230. The court followed the quoted textual language with the statement: "However, it is unneces-
sary to consider those issues in the present case, intriguing as they may be, because we are convinced
that the trial court properly found collateral estoppel by judgment inapplicable." Henderson, 72 Wn. 2d
at 116. 431 P.2d at 966. The court held that collateral estoppel was inapplicable because the first
judgment was ambiguous, the same issue was not necessarily decided in the two actions, and to apply
collateral estoppel would work an injustice.
231. 2 Wn. App. 888, 471 P.2d 103 (1970).
232. Chronologically, these cases have included Sample v. Chapman, 7 Wn. App. 129, 497 P.2d
1334 (1972) (invitee's unsuccessful action against tenant collaterally estopped invitee in second action
against lessor: person estopped was plaintiff in both proceedings): Simpson Timber Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 19 Wn. App. 535, 576 P.2d 437 (1978) (manufacturer who was held liable for
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What of the possiblity of a stranger invoking issue preclusion for offen-
sive purposes? The dictum in the original Henderson case stated that there
are many instances in which the "offensive-defensive distinction" should
not be permitted to obstruct the application of collateral estoppel.233 Cases
since then have so held in allowing a stranger to benefit in an offensive
context. 234
There is then considerable authority in Washington dispensing with the
requirement of mutuality. The specific factors to be considered and the
circumstances in which a stranger will be allowed to benefit remain to be
worked out in greater detail. Of vital concern is whether the person who
will be bound had the motivation and the opportunity to present the case
fully and fairly in the first proceeding.235 More fundamentally, what is
involved is whether the application of collateral estoppel in favor -of a
stranger will work an injustice.
That, again, is the last question the court will ask, not just with respect to
the narrow problem of mutuality, but the entire concept of issue preclusion.
Cases, from the very old to the most recent, have turned on that question.
In resolving the question, courts have considered many diverse factors,
some rather specific and others very general. These have included such
considerations as whether the first judgment was appealable,236 whether
there has been a major factual change since the first proceeding, 237 whether
collapse of a wood stave flume was collaterally estopped when it sought indemnification from insurance
companies; person estopped was defendant in first action and plaintiff in second); Dunlap v. Wild, 22
Wn. App. 583, 591 P.2d 834 (1979) (purchaser of securities who had prevailed in action against stock
brokerage firm was collaterally estopped from seeking additional relief from firm's salesman; person
estopped was plaintiff in both proceedings).
Of course, invocation of collateral estoppel by a stranger will succeed only if all other requirements
of the doctrine are met. Gibson v. Northern Pac. Beneficial Ass'n Hosps., 3 Wn. App. 214, 473 P.2d
440 (1970).
233. Actually, Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72wn. 2d 109, 431 P.2d 961 (1967), itself
involved an attempted offensive use. While unsuccessful, it was not for that reason, but rather because
the issues were not the same in the two proceedings and application of collateral estoppel would work an
injustice.
234. Chronologically, these cases have included Lange v. Heglund, 391 . Supp. 128 (W.D. Wash.
1974) (federal district court concluded Washington would recognize offensive use of collateral estop-
pel); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Cannon, 26 Wn. App. 922, 615 P.2d 1316 (1980) (bank in subsequent
civil action benefitted by conviction of defendant in prior criminal case); United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Boyd,
34 Wn. App. 372, 661 P.2d 987 (1983) (in action by insurer to recover payments it made to its insured,
latter was collaterally estopped from denying that his judgment against third party for the loss did not
constitute full compensation).
235. See Dunlap v. Wild, 22 Wn. App. 583, 591 P.2d 834 (1979); Simpson Timber Co. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. Co., 19 Wn. App. 535, 576 P.2d 437 (1978).
236. United States v. 111.2 Acres of Land, 293 . Supp. 1042 (E.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 435 F.2d
561 (9th Cir. 1970). Cf. Dolan v. Scott, 25 Wash. 214, 65 P. 190 (1901). Another factor ofconsequence in
the former case was that preclusion would have resulted in a party being affected differently than others
on the same facts.
237. See Riblet v. Ideal Cement Co., 54 Wn. 2d 779, 345 P.2d 173 (1959).
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preclusion would mislead or confuse a jury,2 38 whether the principal issues
upon which liability is premised have been fairly and fully litigated in the
former action, 239 whether the first determination was manifestly erro-
neous, 240 and whether, overall, there would be patent injustice.24'
The point is well illustrated by Kennedy v. City of Seattle.242 In the first
action the city prosecuted Kennedy in a municipal court for a criminal
misdemeanor violation of a houseboat ordinance. The case was dismissed
following a ruling that the ordinance was unconstitutional. Kennedy then
brought an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the ordinance was
unconstitutional and contended that the city was collaterally estopped on
the issue. The state supreme court held that the constitutionality of the
ordinance should not be determined by an unappealed municipal court
ruling and that the relitigation of such an important public question should
not be foreclosed by collateral estoppel. The court stated that to reach such
a result would be "manifestly unjust. 243
Once again, this is as it should be. There is danger that in seeking to
relieve the crowded dockets and backlog of litigation, courts will too
readily turn to the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel. It is critical
to remember that the doctrines of claim and issue preclusion are court-
created concepts. Accordingly, they can be adjusted to accommodate
whatever considerations are necessary to achieve the final objective-
doing justice.
238. Roper v. Mabry, 15 Wn. App. 819, 551 P.2d 1381 (1976).
239. Rains v. State, 100 Wn. 2d 660,674 P.2d 165 (1983) Jackson v. Standard Oil Co., 8 Wn. App.
83, 505 P.2d 139 (1972).
240. Henderson v. Bardahl Int'l Corp., 72 Wn. 2d 109, 431 P.2d 961 (1967).
241. See State v. Harris, 78 Wn. 2d 894,480 P.2d 484, rev'd on a separate, constitutional ground,
Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971).
242. 94 Wn. 2d 376, 617 P.2d 713 (1980).
243. On the merits the ordinance was in part sustained and in part held unconstitutional.
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